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Hughes: Flight From Cuba

FLIGHT FROM CUBA
JOYCE A. HUGHES*

I. INTRODUCTION
We live, after all, in an age of mass exodus. The flight from Cuba has
taken place on our very doorstep, affected our politics and contributed to
the changing face of our culture.
According to one estimate, 100 million persons move from one country
to another, which is about two percent of the world's population Cubans
have been involved in that movement and those who migrate to the United
States have been called its "special favorites." 3 They have also been called
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois; B.A.,
Carleton College; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School. The First National Meeting of
the Regional People of Color Legal Scholarship Conferences was the catalyst to complete and
publish this article. Thanks to Pegeen Bassett and Marcia Lehr, librarians at Northwestern
University School of Law who were attentive to my research needs. For their research assistance, thanks also to Northwestern University Law School students Ann-Marie Beckford,
Margarita Musa and Elizabeth Ynigo. Two Florida attorneys provided unpublished decisions.
For that information, I am grateful to Wilfredo 0. Allen and Ralph E. Fernandez. The foregoing assistance was invaluable but the views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. David Richards, The Epic Saga of a Cuban Family: 4 Plays in 6 Hours Span 50
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at B17.
2. See Stanley Meisler, U.N. Cites Looming Migration Crisis, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 7,
1993, at 10.
3. GILBERT LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS-REFUGEES AND
AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 66 (1986) [hereinafter LOESCHER &
SCANLAN]. "A clear 'double standard' which governed the acceptability of migrants from particular countries emerged as a principal feature American refugee policy. Cubans were the
principal beneficiary of this double standard. The Haitians were the principal losers." Id. See
also FELIx ROBERTO MASUD-PILOTO, WITH OPEN ARMs: CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED

STATES 111-15 (1988) [hereinafter MASUD-PILOTO I]. An incident which graphically illustrates the difference is recounted in congressional hearings:
[A] Haitian boat was coming in off the coast of Miami about five miles out. There
were 131 Haitians on the boat. They stopped and picked up two Cubans who were
drowning. Their boat had capsized and they were about to die. They then came
into the port in Miami. The Haitians were all interned.., and sent back to Haiti.
The two Cubans were marched around on the shoulders of their fellow cubans [sic]
in Little Havana and are eligible for citizenship in one year.
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"self-imposed political exiles" 4 and "consumer refugees."5 These are labels
that have been associated with Cubans' migration since Fidel Castro took
control in 1959.6 Prior to the United States closing its Consular Office in
Cuba two years later,' migrants could obtain visas.8 Then visas were waived.'
As the title of a book suggests, the United States welcomed Cubans "with
open arms.""0 There were 690,000 Cubans admitted to the United States between 1962 and April 1979." An additional 125,000 Cubans came in 1980
when Fidel Castro opened the port of Mariel. This opening spurred the
"Freedom Flotilla" and resulted in those 125,000 Cubans being called

Marielitos. 2 The United States is now home to almost one million Cubans/Cuban-Americans.' 3

The term "special favorites" was thus accurate for Cubans coming to the
United States from 1959 until 1994. They were not required to qualify for a
visa under the categories established for immigrants. Nor were they required
to establish individually that they were refugees who qualified for asylum. In

order to obtain asylum under U.S. law, an individual usually must show that
he/she is a refugee. A refugee is one who has been persecuted or has a well-

founded fear of persecution "on account of' race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." The Cubans however, have not been required to make that showing until recently. While their
original admission to the United States has been based on refugee status,
The Situation in Haiti and U.S. Policy: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and
hIt'l Organizationsand the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm.
on ForeignAffairs, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1992) (statement of Rep. Johnston).
4. LOESCHER & ScANLAN, supra note 3, at 66.
5. Id. at 75.
6. See generally John Scanlan & Gilbert Loescher, U.S. Foreign Policy 1959-80: Impact
on Refugee Flowfrom Cuba,467 ANNALS (1983) [hereinafter Scanlan & Loescher].
7. This Office was closed two years after Castro's 1959 revolutionary triumph, which
"triggered the largest migration ever of Cubans to the United States." MASUD-PmoTO I, supra
note 3, at 12.
8. See id. at 34; S. REP. No. 1675, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
9. See H.R. 1978, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) at 2. Waivers were authorized by INA §
212(d) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1993). It was argued that visa waivers are for "non-immigrants"
and thus should not have been available at the time to Cubans who intended to remain indefinitely in the U.S. See J. Patton Hyman 1111,
The Status of CubanRefugees in the United States,
21 U.F. L. REv. 73 (1968).
10. See MASUD-PILOTOI, supra note 3.
11. See Ira Kurzban, A CriticalAnalysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 187 n.31
(1982).
12. See Lisandro Pdrez, Cubans in the UnitedStates, 467 ANNALS 126, 130 (1986).
13. Miami, Florida "and its suburbs are home to half the 1.1 million Cubans and CubanAmericans in the U.S. ..." Cuban Exiles Protest New U.S. Policy, CI-.Tam. May 9, 1995,
at 12. See Melita Marie Garza, The Cubanizationof an American City, Review of CrIY ON THE
EDGE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF MIAMI by Alejandro Portes andAlex Stepick, CHi.TRiB.,Nov.
18, 1993, at 3.
14. See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1999). Like "exile," the term "refugee" implies that one has been forced to leave one's country. However the possibility of return is often a concomitant of the notion of exile.
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Cubans/Cuban-Americans are often referred to using the term "exile"'5 instead of "refugee."' 6 Consistent with this historical treatment.of Cubans, Fidel Castro's daughter was assumed to be a refugee entitled to asylum when
she fled to the United States in December 1993."7 The U.S. response was
such that Cubans "believe[d] that immigrating to the United States was their
natural right. 8 In fact, rules for the migration were dictated mainly by political and not humanitarian considerations."' 19
The United States' welcoming arms policy towards Cubans changed a
few months after Castro's daughter came, with the advent of rafters (balseros). The balseros were not allowed to reach the continental United States,
but instead were detained at the U.S. naval base on Guantdinamo Bay. A
news photo, which would have been unthinkable shortly after Castro's revolutionary triumph in 1959, appeared forty years later in 1999.20 The photo
showed U.S. Coast Guard officers blocking entry to Cubans a few yards

from the U.S. shore.2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
1999 appeal of a Florida Immigration Judge's decision to grant asylum to
Cuban migrants' also suggests a new era.
This article takes no position on the Cuban revolution and Fidel Castro's
triumph of 1959. Its purpose is to chronicle migration from Cuba and the
15. See FELIX ROBERTO MASUD-PILOTO,

FROM WELCOMED EXILES

TO ILLEGAL

IMMIGRANTS (1996) [hereinafter MASUD-PILOTO I]; Mireya Navarro, Miami's Generationsof
Exiles Side by Side, Yet Worlds Apart, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1999, at Al; Julie Vorman,
Weather Foils Memorial, Cm. SuN-TImES, Mar. 3, 1996 at 3 ("flotilla of anti-Castro exiles");
Mireya Navarro, Exile Returns, Lured by Memory of Cuba, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept 24, 1995, at 1;
Cuban Exiles Protest New U.S. Policy, Cm. TRIB., May 5, 1995, at 12; Peter T. Kilbom,
White Males and the Manager Class, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at A7 ("Cubans, who are
'brave exiles from Communism') (emphasis added in all foregoing citations).
16. One commentator noted that Cubans "'have succeeded as immigrants and failed as
exiles."' Max Castro, quoted in Mireya Navarro, Miami's Generationof Exiles Side by Side,
Yet Worlds Apart,N.Y. TnMEs, Feb. 11, 1999, at Al.
17. See A Daughterof CastroFlees Cuba and is GrantedAsylum in U.S., STAR TRIBUNE,
Dec. 23, 1993,at A2. Castro has never publicly acknowledged paternity and Alina Fernandez
Revuelta said "I've never spoken of Mr. Castro as my father." Castro'sDaughter Tells Tale
of Defection, STAR TREBuNE, Dec. 24, 1993, at A4.
18. MASUD-PILOTO I,
supra note 15, at 1.
19. Id. at 3.
20. See A Few Feet Short of Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at A17.
21. The effort was based on a reported distinction in treatment between those who reach
land and those who do not.
When the Coast Guard blocked the Cubans' rowboat, the Cubans jumped into the
ocean and tried to swim the few dozen yards to shore. Two made it, despite frantic
efforts to stop them; four were seized in the water. Touching land was crucial for
the six men because Cubans halted by the American authorities at sea are usually
returned to Cuba while those who make it to shore are generally allowed to stay in
the United States.

Id. This statement confuses the high seas and territorial waters. See infra Section IV
and note 200.
22. See In re Bello-Puente, et al.,
infra Section V.
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United States response thereto, concentrating on the issues of refugees and
asylum. But there are limits to this approach. Written Immigration Judge decisions are not generally available and while their decisions can be appealed
to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"),' only its precedent decisions
are reported publicly. Most importantly, contested cases arise when there is a
dispute. If persons are admitted to the United States because of presidential
fiat or political policies, few cases result. Nonetheless, the available cases
involving Cuban migrants do illuminate the parameters of U.S. policy.' The
general U.S.-Cuba relationship will be described in Section I. In Section II,
U.S. policy towards those who fled from 1959-1994 will be discussed. Section III will address the balseros in the 1990s and migration accords representing a policy change concerning Cuba-U.S. migration. Section IV will
discuss claims for asylum by Cubans who arrived in the United States after
1996, and a concluding comment will finish the article.
II. CUBA AND THE U.S.

[One cannot describe] Cuba without reference to its socialist revolution,

the most thorough and radical in twentieth-century Latin America, which

[has] profoundly altered nearly every aspect of life on the island during
the... years since its triumph on January 1, 1959.2
Cuba is a Caribbean island located just west of Haiti and only ninety
miles south of Florida. Christopher Columbus landed there in 1492 and
Spaniard Diego Velsquez began colonization in 1513, resulting in destitution and misery for the native population. That population was augmented
after 1713 when African slaves were imported. From 1820 to 1830 there
were "several unsuccessful revolts for Cuban independence."' While the
Monroe Doctrine of U.S. president James Monroe "defended the rights of
the newly independent republics [in the New World] against foreign interference,"' 7 it supported Spanish domination over Cuba. A War of Independence was begun in 1895 under the inspiration of Jos6 Martf who underscored
the need for Cuba to be free from all foreign power, both Spain and the
United States. The sinking of the U.S. battleship Maine in Havana Harbor
was the event that prompted the Spanish-American War of 1898.' The hos23. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1997).
24. Cf. Silva v. Bell, 605 F. 2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979) involving the system of charging
against the Western Hemisphere quota the visa numbers assigned to approximately 145,000
Cubans given permanent resident status from 1968 -1976.
25. FOREIGN AREA STUDIES, AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY, CUBA A COUNTRY STUDY xiX
(James D. Rudolph, ed. 1965) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY]. The following history is generally from Country Study. See Loescher & Scanlan, supra note 3, at 60-67.
26. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 25, at 14.
27. Id.
28. One scholar argues that the conflict should not be called the Spanish-American War
because that term erases Cuba's role. See Louis A. PFREZ, JR., THE WAR OF 1898: THE
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tilities ended with the Treaty of Paris signed by the United States and Spain
in October 1898 under which Spain lost Cuba.29
When the Spaniards relinquished authority over Cuba on January 1,
1899, the United States installed a military government to administer the island." The U.S. military government ended in 1902 when power was transferred to Tomas Estrada Palma, a newly elected Cuban president, who had
been a "longtime resident of the United States."31 But from 1901 until its repeal in 1934, the U.S. Platt Amendment restricted Cuba's self-determination
and "was a tremendous humiliation to all Cubans.. ."' since it "turned Cuba
into an American protectorate."33 That enactment was the basis for the U.S.
acquisition of rights to what became the Guant.namo Bay naval base.'
Throughout the existence of the Platt Amendment, the United States intervened in Cuban affairs.35 That enactment ended in 1934, the year that "Batista became the new arbiter of Cuban politics."36 Batista assumed power after a bloodless coup d'etat in 1952. Under his influence "the Presidential
Palace became the home of some of Cuba's most notorious thieves. '37 Fulgencio Batista's own "corrupt and repressive dictatorship 3' ended when
Fidel Castro came to power in 1959.
In 1953, Fidel Castro lead a revolt against Batista, known as the Moncada incident. This revolt failed and Batista inaugurated "repressive measUNITED STATES AND CUBA IN HISTORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY (1998); Karen J. Winder, New

Wave of Research Changes Views of Cuba, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED., Jan. 8, 1999.
<http:\\www.chronicle.com\weekly\b45\i18\18a01701.htm> Cuban scholars argue that "Cuban forces themselves were about to defeat the Spanish before the United States intervened. . . ."Id.

29. "The terms of the armistice represented the end of the Spanish overseas empire.
Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine islands, and other islands in the Pacific and the

West Indies to the United States." COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 25, at 21.
30. U.S. attitudes were not pro annexation because of the large Black population in Cuba
and the economic devastation caused by war. See id. at 22.

31. Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 23. The Platt Amendment provided, inter alia, that all acts of the U.S. military

government had to be accepted as legitimate; Cuba had to lease lands for coaling and naval
stations and had to grant the United States the privilege to intervene at any time to "preserve
Cuban independence or to support a government capable of protecting life, liberty, and indi-

vidual liberties." Id. The Amendment became part of Cuba's "organic law" by a one-vote
margin of Cuba's Assembly. See MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 12.
33. MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 12.
34. The United States' right to occupy land for a naval base at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba

began "under the terms of the May 1903 Treaty of Relations (also known as the Permanent

Reciprocity Treaty of 1903) and the Lease Agreement of July 1903." COUNTRY STUDY, su-

pra note 25, at 23.
35. "The United States regarded the island as a vantage point from which to monitor its
growing interests in the Caribbean basin" and Cuban Independence "was tempered by the of-

ten-exercised power of intervention by the United States." COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 25, at
3. See MASuD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 16.

36. MASUD-PILOTO H, supra note 15, at 16.
37. Id.
38. Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 36 [1999], No. 1, Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

ures" against some of its participants. 39 After two years in jail, Castro benefited from Batista's general amnesty, which freed most political prisoners.
The date of the Moncada incident was the name of a movement which organized for another attack against the government, the 26th of July Movement, (Movimiento 26 de Julio). That attack also failed but some participants
were able to escape to the Sierra Maestra mountains including Fidel, Rail
Castro and Ernesto (Ch) Guevara.
The revolution succeeded on January 1, 1959 when Castro and his followers came from the mountains.4 Batista then fled." The first response to
Castro in Cuba was positive. "The overwhelming majority of the Cuban
people recognized Castro as a revolutionary hero, who, despite tremendous
odds, had defeated [a] corrupt and brutal dictatorship .... Most important to
the majority of Cubans, Castro represented the hope of a new beginning."'
Initially, American reactions to the Cuban revolution were "cautiously cordial.' '43 But it soon became apparent that "Castro was unacceptable...."
In April 1959 Castro accepted an invitation to the U.S. from the American Society of Newspaper Editors. President Eisenhower was against the
visit but was advised not to refuse Castro a visa. Nonetheless, Eisenhower
did not meet with him. "Clearly, Castro and the Eisenhower Administration
differed as to what kind of revolution Cuba should have. '4' Then on July 5,
1960 the U.S. canceled Cuba's quota for sugar exports to the United States.
Cuba then nationalized United States institutions operating in the country, as
well as Cuban owned enterprises. On January 3, 1961 U.S. President Dwight
D. Eisenhower broke diplomatic and- consular relations.' Shortly thereafter
John F. Kennedy, a newly inaugurated U.S. president, approved previous
plans for the invasion of Cuba.4' However, he prohibited any direct involvement of U.S. forces and did not allow United States aircraft to be used for

39. Id. at 36.
40. See Fidel Castro, Speech on the 40th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, Jan. 1,
1999, 29 BLACK SCHOLAR 39 (1999).
41. See MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 18. Batista went first to the Dominican Re-

public and then to Portugal.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. at 20.
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. at 21-22.
46. See Statement of the presidenton terminatingdiplomatic relations with Cuba, 1 PuB.
PAPERS 388 (Jan. 3, 1961).

47.
Nowhere.. . was American involvement with guerrilla movements, or with the exiles who manned them, more extensive than in Cuba. That involvement, which had
as its consistent goal the removal of Fidel Castro from power, contributed directly
to the laissez faire policy which permitted tens of thousands of Cubans 'temporarily' to enter the United States during 1960 and the early months of 1961.
LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note

3, at 61.
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the Bay of Pigs4' invasion, which occurred on April 17, 1961. It was two
days later that the 1297 invaders surrendered. 9 About 200 individuals had
been killed and the rest were taken prisoner. However, they were released
for return to the United States before Christmas 1962.5' It was after the Bay
of Pigs that Castro "stated the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution,
and... declared himself a Marxist-Leninist. Analysts claimed that these
were clear attempts to gain economic and military support from the Soviet
Union and its allies." 5'
Less than two years after the Bay of Pigs, the Soviet missile crisis occurred. There was a buildup of Soviet surface-to-air antiaircraft missile bases
in Cuba. When the United States learned of this, President Kennedy spoke
on television on October 22, 1962 and warned that America was on the brink
of nuclear war with the Soviets. A naval quarantine of Cuba was imposed.
"Nuclear brinkmanship"52 between the Soviet Union and the U.S. ensued until October 28, 1962 when the matter was settled between John F. Kennedy
and Nikita Krushchev." An agreement between the then superpowers provided that "Cuba would have immunity against military aggression by the
United States as long as it did not become a base for Soviet offensive weapons."' Other key terms were for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and
elimination of the American naval blockade." Cuban President Fidel Castro
was not consulted about this agreement, and Cuba's relationship with the
Soviet Union was strained "because the Soviets had initiated and resolved
the situation
with little regard for Cuba's interests or its national sover56
eignty."
Although "Moscow had nothing to do with the Cuban revolution's tri-

48. The name comes from the point of disembarkation, the Bay of Pigs (Playa Gir6n).
See COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 25, at 44. While the U.S. did not provide air cover, the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) trained the Cuban exiles. See The U.S. and Cuba: A
Tense History,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at C7.
49. In a report on the incident, the C.I.A. listed its failure to recommend that the invasion
be canceled as "success had become dubious" and there was not in Cuba "a responsive underground movement ready to rally to the invasion force." The C.I.A. on the C.I.A.: Scathing
View ofInvasion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at Y6.
50. Castro established a ransom of about $62 million in medical supplies for their release. However, they were freed even before arrival of the ransom. See COUNTRY STUDY, SUtpra note 25.
51. Id. at 43.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Ironically, the son of Nikita Krushchev became a naturalized U.S. citizen "four decades after his father... provocatively vowed from the Kremlin, 'We will bury you'...."
Krushchev is Pledging New Allegiance, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, at 1.
54. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 25, at 46. Defense Department documents reportedly
show that a U.S. invasion to overthrow Castro was proposed in April 1992. See Documents
RevealAnti-Cuba Schemes, CH. SUN TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1997, at 42.
55. The terms are in letters exchanged between Kennedy and Krushchev. See LOESCHER
& SCANLAN, supra note 3, at 245.
56. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 25, at 46.
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umph... the realities of a bi-polar world '""? meant that Cuban-American re-

lations were entangled in the Cold War. Cuba relied on Soviet economic aid
until 1992.58 "'Moscow's aid' [went] from a torrent to a trickle and then to

nothing."59 It was not until June 1993, during the "special period,"' that So-

viet troops departed Cuba permanently.!6' This occurred after twenty-five

years of Soviet presence in Cuba.
While the focus of this article is on the interaction of the United States
with those who have fled Cuba, the situation of those migrants should be
viewed in the context of the United States' relationship with that country.
Although the Cold War is not a feature of the 1990s, still the United States'

relationship with Cuba has been marked by policies that emanate therefrom.
It has been an acrimonious relationship ever since Castro came to power.
Operation Mongoose was launched in 1961. Operation Mongoose, launched
in 1961, included attempts to assassinate Castro by "exploding cigars, poisoned diving suits, paramilitary attacks, and a pen with a poisoned needle."'62
More than thirty-five years later, there was agitation to deny a visa for Castro to join 150 "leaders, including kings, presidents and prime ministers"'63 in
New York to mark the United Nations 50th Anniversary. Castro "was issued a very limited visa," 5 but did receive "the strongest applause of any
speaker in the opening session"'6 of the U.N. general assembly. Castro also

found support for his view that the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba should end.6'

That embargo was imposed by President Kennedy in 1962 pursuant to

57. MASUD-PILOTO II, supranote 15, at 29.
58. See Andrew Phillips, Soul-searchingin Cuba,MACLEAN'S, Feb. 2, 1998, at 34.
59. George J. Church, Cubans Go Home, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 34.
60. MARCIA FRIEDMAN, CUBA-THE SPECIAL PERIOD (1998).
61. See CHI. SUN-TImES, June 16, 1993, at 8; see also Russia to Withdraw Brigade that
was Sent to Cuba in 62, N.Y. Timm, Sept. 17, 1992, at A15. The Soviet Union then no longer
existed, having dissolved in 1991. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1992 BRrrANNICA
BOOK OF THE YEAR 443. The previous constituent states were renamed the Commonwealth of
Independent States. See U.S. COMM. ON REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1992, 78
(1992); 1992 BRrrAN, CA BOOK OF THE YEAR (Cuba).
62. The U.S. and Cuba: A Tense History, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1994, at C7. From 1960 1965 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was involved in at least 8 attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. See Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 6, at 117 n. 2.
63. Terry Atlas, GOP howls, but Clinton will OK Castro visa for UN visit, CHI. TRm.,
Oct. 11, 1995, at 13.
64. "As host country for the UN, the U.S. has an obligation to grant [Castro's] visa request and has never turned down such a request from a head of state to attend the UN ......
Id.
65. Lizette Alvarez, For Castro's Visit, Both Cold Shoulder and 'Fidelmania,' N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1995, at A5. Castro was excluded from some social events associated with the
U.N. Anniversary. See Atlas, supra note 63.
66. Doyle McManus, Castro Chides UN, Blasts U.S., CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995, at
3; see Lizette Alvarez, Castro Goes to Lunch, Dishes Up Old Themes, N.Y. Tivm, Oct. 24,
1995, at A7.
67. See Alvarez, supra note 65.
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Congressional authority,' and was linked to "the subversive offensive of
Sino-Soviet Communism with which the Government of Cuba is publicly
aligned... "69 The United States is the only country, which prohibits trade
with Cuba," and the United Nations has disagreed with that policy." Notwithstanding its isolated position, thirty years after the first U.S. embargo,
the U.S. tightened its position with the Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli
Bill). 2 It is understandable why the United States would resort to an economic boycott to attempt to force political changes in Cuba. Since the resolution of the nuclear crisis with the Soviet Union prohibited the United
States from invading Cuba, it does not have that option to express its policy
disapproval, as it did in 1983 with the invasion of another Caribbean nation.73 The embargo represents an effort by the United States to force politi-

cal changes in Cuba and has resulted in some convictions.74 Although that

embargo has been in effect since 1962, a year after the Bay of Pigs invasion,
political changes have not materialized." Nonetheless, the U.S. has added to
68. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 620(a), 75 Stat. 445 § 62 (1962).
69. Presidential Doe., Proclamation 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, Feb. 3,
1962.
70. See The Senate Votes to Tighten Curbs on Trade With Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
1995, at A5.
71. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, U.N. Votes, 157-2, in Nonbinding Referendum Against U.S.
Embargo of Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at A12.
72. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1993). See generally Julia P. Herd, Note, The Cuban Democracy Act: Another ExtraterritorialAct That Won't Work; 20 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 397
(1994); Berta Esperanza Hem.ndez-Truyol, Out In Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War Strikeout, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 15 (1994); Trevor R. Jeffries, The Cuban Democracy Act of
1992: A Rotten Carrot and a Broken Stick?, 16 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 75 (1993); Allen DeLoach Stewart, Comment, New World Ordered:The Asserted ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof the
Cuban DemocracyAct of 1992, 53 LA. L. REv. 1389 (1993).
73. See Larry Rohter, 13 Years After Invasion, GrenadaAgonizes Anew, N.Y. TIMES,
May 21, 1997, at A4; see also Memories, emotions run high in Grenadaduring Castrovisit,
STAR TRIB., Aug. 3, 1998, at Al. The U.S. justified its military intervention in Grenada by the
need "to protect U.S. medical students at a university ..... Id.
74. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mako, 994 F. 2d 1526 (8th Cir. 1963) (conviction for exporting machinery to Cuba); Wash v. Brady, 927 F. 2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (prohibition on poster importer from paying for travel to Cuba to obtain posters); U.S. v. Fuentes-Coba, 738 F. 2d 1191
(11th Cir. 1984) (conviction for shipment of airline parts and communication equipment to
Cuba); Capital Cities ABC, Inc. v. Brady, 740 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (involving
broadcast of 1991 Pan American games). As exemplified by some of the above cases, the
trade embargo is solidified by restrictions on travel-related transactions. See infra notes 86-95
and accompanying text.
75. Just before the 36th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, Fidel Castro acknowledged
he has obtained some "political mileage" from the embargo, but he insisted that "it would
never force the sort of political opening that has been its stated goal." He said:
The United States did not blockade South Africa. It does not blockade Saudi Arabia where few rich families own all of the wealth. The United States does not dictate political conditions to China. It does not dictate political conditions to Vietnam. Why does it have to dictate political conditions to us?
Tim Golden & Larry Rohter, An Evening With Castro, 36 Years and No Regrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1994, at Al. Castro also stated he had "reservations about market-oriented reforms
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its legislative arsenal against Cuba.
Among the purposes of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (known as the Helms-Burton Act)76 is strengthening the economic embargo. This Act codifies what were executive orders
and thus Congress must now be involved in lifting the embargo.' The statute
was passed in response to Cuba's shooting down civilian planes over international waters,78 which killed three U.S. citizens and a Cuban national79 operating for Hermanos Al Rescate or Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR). The
BTTR "fits among the most uncompromising anti-Castro organizations in
the political spectrum of Cuban exiles .... .""The BTTR incident has no di-

rect relationship to nationals leaving Cuba, but provides a backdrop for
United States response to that migration. Two provisions of Helms-Burton
are controversial.

Title III8 permits suits in American courts against companies that "traf-

fic" in Cuban property seized when Castro took power decades ago." Title
his government has undertaken to save an economy devastated by the collapse of the Soviet
Bloc." Id.
76. 22 U.S.C. § 6022 (1997). See generally Note, The Helms-Burton Act: Is the U.S.
Shooting Itself in the Foot?, 35 SAN DiEGo L. Rv. 897 (1999); W. Fletcher Fairey, Comment,
The Hehns-Burton Act: The Effect of InternationalLaw on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM.
U. L. REv. 1289 (1997); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Note, Agora: The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)at: Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 A. J. I. L. 419
(1996); Richard D. Porotshy, Note, Economic Coercion and the GeneralAssembly: A PostCold War Assessment of the Legality and the Utility of the 35-Year-Old Embargo Against
Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 901 (1995).
77. See Michael Wines, Senate Approves Compromise Bill Tightening Curbs on Cuba,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 1996, at A7.
78. There was a dispute between Cuba and the U.S. about the location of the planes, with
the former claiming they were within Cuba's 12-mile territorial airspace and the latter denying it. See U.S. Shows Cuba it Erred in Shootdown, CHI. TRM., Mar. 17, 1996, at 16. However, prior thereto BTrR "had apparently violated Cuban airspace in the past and a third plane
did so [in the February 1996 incident] before returning safely to Florida at the time the other
two were downed. Cuba had warned the United States that it might shoot down the pilots if
they entered Cuban territory." Clinton Seeking Wider SanctionsAgainst Cubans, N.Y. TIES,
Feb. 27, 1996, at Al.
79. Of the citizens of Cuban descent, two were born in the United States and the third
was born in Cuba although a resident of Miami from an early age who became a naturalized
citizen. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S. D. Fla. 1997). Damages of
$187.5 million against Cuba were awarded. In Alejandre, plaintiffs were allowed to collect
part of that judgment "by garnishing debts owed to a Cuban telecommunications company,"
but the judgment was vacated by Alejandre v. Telefonica Large Dist. De Puerto Rico, Inc.,
183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
80. Mireya Navarro, Pilots' Group, Firm Foe of Castro,Ignored Risks, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
26, 1996, at A5. It had flown 1800 flights before is first casualties in the February 1996 incident. Its supporters condemned Cuba for shooting down unarmed civilian aircraft while others
contended that BTTR should not have engaged in provocative action. BTTR was founded by
veterans of the Bay of Pigs and has engaged in provocative actions against Cuba, such as
dropping leaflets over the island. See Bello-Puente, infra note 208, at 16.
81. 22 U.S.C. § 6081 (1998).
82. The President can suspend this provision and Clinton has waived it repeatedly. See
Hehns-Burton:Two Years Later,Hearing before Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss1/4

10

Hughes: Flight From Cuba

1999]

FLIGHT FROM CUBA

IV denies entry into the United States of any individual who "traffics" in
property confiscated by Cuba or a person who is an officer, principal or controlling shareholder of an entity which has been involved with confiscated
property." Excluding persons from the U.S. "is a time-honored component
of U.S. foreign policy, intended to signal to a foreign government that the
U.S. does not approve of its actions."" Other countries have expressed opposition to the Helms-Burton law.' This law attempts to isolate Cuba, by
among other things, forcing companies to choose between doing business in
Cuba and having its officials come to the United States. While HelmsBurton prevents persons from coming into the United States based upon certain involvement in Cuba, other measures are designed to keep persons from
going out of the United States into Cuba. Refusing United States entry to executives of companies that "traffic" in confiscated Cuban property has not
impacted large numbers of persons.86 However, restrictions on travel from
the United States to Cuba affect many more.'
A travel ban was first imposed in 1961, and the Supreme Court considered its validity in Zemel v. Rusk," a six to three decision. The majority held
that the Passport Act of 1926"9 authorized the State Department's refusal to
validate U.S. passports for travel to Cuba. They further held that there was

no constitutional impediment to area travel restrictions." Significantly, the
Court was impressed that the restriction was imposed "because of foreign

policy considerations affecting all citizens."9 Its necessity was found in the
fact that "Cuba is the only area in the Western Hemisphere controlled by a
& Trade, Com. Int'l Relations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 12, 1998) at 77-79.
83. See 22 U.S.C. § 6091 (1998).
84. 76 INTEPP.REL. 293 (Mar. 11, 1996).
85. See Anthony DePalma, Canada andMexico Team Up To Oppose U.S. Law on Cuba,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1996, at A9.
86. Since Helms-Burton, 19 "firms from over six countries have changed their plans for
investment in Cuba or have pulled out of investments there." Fifteen executives from one firm
have been kept out of the United States because of involvement with U.S.-claimed property in
Cuba. Helms-Burton Two Years Later, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Int'l Policy and
Trade of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, H.R. 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 12, 1998).
87. Between 120,000 and 140,000 people are estimated to travel from the U.S. to Cuba
annually. See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeking Wider Sanctions Against Cubans, N.Y.
TIMn, Feb. 27, 1999, at Al. But the travel restrictions function as a deterrent to persons who
do not qualify for a license and/or will forego travel to a location where transportation must
be through a third country.
88. 381 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965).
89. 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958), cited in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (U.S.
Conn. 1965).
90. The Court found that under the 1926 Act, the President could impose area restrictions
since he had "openly asserted the power" under earlier versions of the statute. Since the Congress did not change the language, it was concluded that the legislature intended to maintain
that authority. By a 1938 Executive Order (E.O. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 681, 687) the President
had delegated to the Secretary of State the authority to establish area restrictions, which were
in effect at the time of the Zemel decision. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.75.
91. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 13.
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Communist government... [and] that a major goal of the Castro regime is
to export its Communist revolution to the rest of Latin America... [and]
that travel... is an important element in the spreading of subversion .... "9
Although Zemel upheld the State Department's 1961 area passport ban,
a 1978 amendment to the Passport Act prohibited the executive branch from
establishing peacetime travel restrictions, except for health and safety reasons.93 It thus removed the authority of the Secretary of State to place area
restrictions on U.S. passports. 94 But that had no effect on the government's
restrictions on travel to Cuba or the Court's need to consider constitutional
questions. Upholding restrictions on travel-related transactions with Cuba in
Regan v. Wald, the Supreme Court noted their prevention of travel to Cuba
was "justified by weighty concerns of foreign policy." 96 Those concerns undoubtedly prompted cancellation of direct flights from Miami to Havana following the BTrR incident mentioned above." Foreign policy concerns certainly dictated the U.S. response to flight from Cuba discussed in the
following sections.
IlL. CUBAN MIGRATION POST-CASTRO To 1994
The revolution introduced a massive redistribution of political power and
wealth 'away from those entrenched groups that benefited from the preRevolutionary order and toward those who have been disadvantaged....'
This revolution eventually brought about the most equitable intra-national
distribution of income in Latin America."

92. Id. at 14. Dissenting Justices Douglas and Goldberg were concerned that the ban on
travel to Cuba was not based on a congressional determination or congressional action specifically giving the executive the right to do so, but only on State Department action. In dissent, Justice Goldberg believed that Congress had the power to impose area restrictions on
travel, but could not find it had done so or granted authority to the executive by the Passport
Act of 1926.
93. See generally id.

94. See Pub. L. No. 95-426 § 124, 92 Stat. 971 (1978).
95. 468 U.S. 222 (U.S. Mass. 1984). In a previous case, the court had reversed convictions of persons who arranged travel to Cuba as there was no statute authorizing criminal
sanctions. See U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (U.S.N.Y. 1967).
96. Regan, 468 U.S. at 242. See 28 Fed. Reg. 5974, 31 C.F.R. § 515.101 (1963). Currently, travel restrictions are implemented by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)
promulgated by the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, pursuant to the
Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 under which the president delegated rule-making authority. "The basic goal of the sanctions is to isolate Cuba economically and deprive it of U.S.
dollars." U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Cuba Travel Restrictions (May 1998). Travel to Cuba is not banned per se but the expenditure of U.S. currency
for these purposes is prohibited. See 50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1988). There are exceptions from current prohibitions for journalists and persons with close relatives in Cuba.
97. See Purdum, supra note 87, at Al.
98. PETER H. KOEHN, REFUGEES FROM REvOLUTION-U.S. POLICY AND THmD-WouD
MIGRATION59 (1991).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss1/4

12

Hughes: Flight From Cuba

1999]

FLIGHT FROM CUBA

The phenomenon of Cubans coming to the United States predates Castro's ascension to power in 1959. In fact, it "precedes the establishment of
the Cuban nation" and was "linked to major political events and economic
conditions on the island."" However, the massive wave of Cubans who came
after Castro undoubtedly influenced "a series of steps undertaken by the
United States to isolate diplomatically, deprive economically, discredit ideologically, and-prior to 1965-overthrow violently the Castro regime. " '
The U.S. responded politically to Cuban migration to the United States beginning with President Eisenhower, and continuing through Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Clinton. There was the free airlift starting
in August 1961;... followed by the Camarioca Boatlift in September 1965;

then the Cuban Airlift from November 1965 until April 1973; next came the
"Freedom Flotilla" of the Marielitos'" in 1980; followed by the balseros in

1994, and finally those attempting entry after Cuba-U.S. migration agreements of 1994 and 1995. The Cubans' flight is bracketed by U.S. foreign
policy issues and Fidel Castro's use of human migration for his own purposes.
Unlike tourists who come for temporary visits, immigrants who seek to
remain in the United States, generally come with family based or employment based visas." There are also those who are admitted as refugees, which
generally requires that the person be outside of his/her country of nationality."4 Each year the number of refugees to be admitted from a particular region, are specified. However, foreigners who are already in the United
States may seek asylum, for which they must be determined to be a refu99. Lisandro Pdrez, Cubans in the United States, 467 ANNALs AM. ACAD. 126, 127
(1986). For a statistical compilation of Cubans admitted to the United States from 1871 to
1958 see id. at 128, tbl. 1.
100. Id. at 117. The option of Castro's violent overthrow was curtailed by resolution of
the missile crisis which resulted in a pledge by the U.S. not to use military aggression against
Cuba. See supra text accompanying note 54.
101. For example, President Kennedy responded to Cuba's requirement that flights be
paid for in dollars by providing air transportation at a cost of $350,000. See MASUD-PLOTO 11,
supra note 15, at 52.
102. Although the author has been advised that some consider the term Marielito to be
pejorative, its use herein is not so intended. It has often been employed to refer to the 125,000
Cubans who migrated from the Port of Mariel, so it avoids confusion to use the same term.
Marielito implies no negative opinion about the Cubans involved therein. Moreover, the characterization of Marielitos as "criminals or social misfits" is a totally false image. See MASUDPILOTO II, supra note 15, at 94, 97.
103. See INA § 203(a), (b), 8 USC § 1153(a), (b) (1999).
104. Not considered separately in this article are Cubans who obtain entry to the United
States by being designated refugees while still in Cuba. To be outside of ones country is an
aspect of the refugee definition. However, "in special circumstances" INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B), allows persons to be deemed refugees notwithstanding location in
his/her own country. Persons from three countries are eligible to be so considered under the
1999 designation: Cuba, Vietnam and the Soviet Union. See William J. Clinton, Memorandum for the Secretary of State re FY 1999 Refugee Admissions Consultations,75 INTERP. REL.
959 (July 13, 1998).
105. See Clinton, supra note 104.
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gee.'" Of greater importance as one considers flight from Cuba is the admission to the United States of persons apart from the above scheme envisioned
by the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").
Among the early arrivals in the United States were persons associated
with Batista, the Cuban president deposed by Castro."l They came as "selfimposed political exiles" who in Cuba had "held positions of wealth, privilege, and power. .. ."" They were not determined to be refugees, which requires that one be individually persecuted or in danger of persecution be-

cause of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion."°

Indeed, they came before the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980." ° Until the U.S.

Consulate closed in January 1961, Cubans could obtain visas."' Persons who
obtained nonimmigrant tourist visas merely overstayed the visa and re-

mained in the U.S. Then possession of a visa was waived." 2 Following a
speech by President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, Castro
stopped Cubans from emigrating to the U.S." 3 and commercial air traffic was
halted."' As President Lyndon Johnson signed a bill to change the basis of
immigration to the United States," 5 he welcomed all Cubans as refugees,
106. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1999).
107. See Scanlan & Loescher, supra note 6, at 117.
108. Id. at 119.
109. Currently the refugee definition is in INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42)
(1999). However, the U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6529, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 contained the same requirement as early as 1951.
110. Refugee Act of 1980, Act of Mar. 11, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 107
(1980), codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
11. MASUD-PILOTO I, supra note 3, at 34. See also S. Rep. No. 1675, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1966).
112. See H.R. 1978, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1966). INA § 212 (d)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1993) authorizes waivers for unforeseen emergencies. It has been suggested that in the
1960's the visa waiver program was for nonimmigrants and thus inapplicable to Cubans who
intended to remain in the U.S. for an indefinite period. See J. Patton Hyman, III, The Status of
Cuban Reftugees in the United States, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 73, 75 (1968). The Peter Pan (Pedro
Pan) program was intended to be temporary. See MASUD-PILOTO 11, supra note 15, at 39. Over
14,000 children came. See id. at 40, 41. "[T]he State Department gave a young Miami priest
the extraordinary authority to allow entry, without a visa, of Cuban children, age 6 to 16."
Pedro Pan-60'sevacuation of Cuban kids createdbroken families, CHI. TRIB. Jan. 12, 1998,
at 11. The children were sent unaccompanied to the U.S. waiting for their parents to obtain
visas or for Castro to be ousted, which was expected shortly. But the Cuban missile crisis of
October 1962 led to the cessation of flights to the U.S. and the children were under foster care
with funding by the U.S. government. See generally YvONNE M. CONDE, OPERATION PEDRO
PAN: THE UNTOLD EXODUS OF 14,000 CUBAN CHILDREN (1999).
113. See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 3, at 64.
114. See vol. 12, pt. 17 CONG. REc. 22,914 (1966) (statement of Rep. Feighhan).
115. President Johnson talked of a bill which had its genesis under President Kennedy
and which changed the basis of imnmigration'to the U.S. He indicated that persons would "be
admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here....
and
noted that in the past, "only 3 countries were allowed to supply 70 percent of all the immigrants." As for Cubans, he said ".... I declare this afternoon to the people of Cuba that those
who seek refuge here in America will find it." Remarks at the Signing of the ImmigrationBill,
Liberty Island, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1038, 1039 (Oct. 3, 1965). For an analysis of the changes
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53

even though a CIA assessment indicated that most Cubans were "disaffected
because of the economic situation and not political repression.""' 6 An "airlift,
also called the freedom flights, started in December, 1965 and lasted until
1973. , ' '
There were 690,000 Cubans who gained entry to the U.S. between 1962
and April 1979 through the parole power."' Initially that power was intended
to provide for the temporary entry of an individual alien in emergency circumstances."' But parole was used for Cubans as a "highly politicized admission device" for massive numbers. 2 ' Neither Cubans nor the U.S. government officials thought the former would stay for any significant period.
But in 1966, eight years after Castro assumed power, the Cubans who fled
were still in the United States. Most of these Cubans were not permanent
wrought by the 1965 immigration revisions, see Charles B. Kelly, Effects of the Immigration
Act of 1965 on Selected Population Characteristicsof Immigrants to the United States, 8
DEMOGRAPHY 157 (1971).
116. MASUD-PLOTO 1I, supra note 15, at 60. If a person is forced to leave his country
"exclusively by economic considerations, he is an economic migrant and not a refugee." Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 62 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter Handbook]; see also
Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, (9th Cir. 1969); Youssefina v. INS, 784 F.2d 1254, 1261 (5th
Cir. 1986); Borca v INS, 77 F.3d 210 (7th Cir. 1996).
117. Pdrez, supra note 99, at 130. More than 260,000 persons came on the flights which
occurred 2 times per day.
118. See Ira Kurzban, A CriticalAnalysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 865, 867
n.31 (1982).
119. See INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1952) (amended 1980) provided:
The attorney General may... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for
reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to
the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the
Attorney General, have been served the alien shall for with return or be returned to
the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that of any applicant for admission to the United
States.
Currently the law prolubits the Attorney General from using parole to bring refugees into the United States unless there are "compelling reasons in the public interest with respect to that particular alien ......
INA § 212(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (emphasis supplied):
The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien who is a refugee unless the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in the public
interest with respect to that particular alien require that the alien be paroled into the
United States rather than admitted as a refugee ....
Id. Nonetheless, parole was used to admit more than 20,000 Cuban balseros in 1995. See infra text accompanying notes 184-187.
120. Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis:A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 9, 18-19 (1981). In 1956 upon the request of President Eisenhower, parole was used to admit 21,500 Hungarians following the
Soviet invasion. Id. at 15. See also infra Sections 1I and V.
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resident aliens. This lawful resident alien status is a precursor to citizenship,
and also necessary for certain occupations.'' Hence the Cuban Adjustment
Act of 1966 [CAA]," and a case decided thereunder is illustrative of the nature of the U.S. response to Cubans.
Indeed, there are few reported federal court cases dealing with pre-1980
Cuban migrants,"z but two involve the CAA, which makes inspected and
admitted or paroledCubans eligible to become permanent residents after one
year in the United States. The result in Matter of Masson,"z a 1968 BIA decision, demonstrates that while the CAA's purpose "was to grant benefits to
Cubans who had fled as refugees from the Fidel Castro government of
Cuba,"' 6 in fact it encompassed all Cubans. Masson was born in Cuba but
left that country long before the Castro revolution. Yet he was able to adjust
his status under CAA. 27 The result in Masson, along with knowledge that
President Kennedy launched for Cubans "the largest, longest-running, and
most expensive aid program for refugees from Latin America ever undertaken by the United States"'" initially might suggest that court decisions
would always favor Cubans. But just as the expenditure of over a billion dollars on the Cuban Refugee Program, which aided more than 700,000 Cubans, "failed to overthrow Castro,"'29 so too being a hero of anti-Castro efforts failed to extricate a Cuban from the adverse consequences of general
United States law applicable to migrants.
Avila v. Rivkind 30 involved an anti-Castro Cuban who initially came to
the U.S. as a nonimmigrant visitor in 1958 and again in 1960. Orlando
Bosch, a "hero of Cuban resistance to Castro's Communist takeover,'' was
affected adversely by legal rules then governing immigration. In 1968 he
was convicted in the U.S. of various criminal offenses "associated with placing explosives on vessels of foreign registry"'32 and threats made to heads of
121. At the time, 41 states insisted that physicians be either permanent residents or U.S.
citizens in order to obtain a license. See CONG. REc. 22,915 (1966). The same was true for
"architects, dentists, lawyers, nurses and teachers." Id.
122. Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(1999)).
123. See Ribas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 54 T.C. 1347 (T.C. 1970); Bosch
v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1970). Both cases were tax court cases involving
Cubans who came to the United States in 1960 and 1961. Claims in both cases were entangled
with Cuba's nationalization of properties left behind.
124. See Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) v. Meese, 643 F. Supp.
983 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979).
125. 12 I. & N. Dec. 699 (BIA 1968).
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. MASuD-PLOTO I, supra note 15, at 54.
129. Id.
130. 724 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
131. Id. at 946. Although the case caption does not have the hyphen usual in Spanish and
Latin names, plaintiff was Orlando Bosch-Avila.
132. Id. at 946.
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countries which traded with Cuba to destroy planes and ships of that country's registry. He was sentenced for the crime and paroled but then violated
its terms by leaving the U.S. In Central and South America he was the head
of CORU, an anti-Castro organization. While in Venezuela he was imprisoned based on charges of conspiracy to bomb a Cuban plane. Upon release
from Venezuelan confinement he entered the U.S. without any documents
and was arrested because of a warrant issued previously for violating parole.
His sentence for that violation was just three months but he was then placed
in custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]. After his
case was considered for more than a year, INS officials concluded that he
should not be excluded from the U.S. as a security risk. But when the case
was sent to the Attorney General for further review, a Final Order of Exclu33
sion was issued based on a finding that plaintiff was in fact a security risk.
The Florida district court noted that an alien seeking admittance to the
U.S. has "no absolute substantive constitutional right,"'" 4 but rather is "requesting a privilege."'' 5 It concluded Bosch's exclusion was supported under
the then existing statutory grounds.
Avila foreshadows the result for some Cubans who came with the
Mariel Freedom Flotilla. Like Bosch, some Marielitos were ruled inadmissible when existing immigration laws were applied to them, despite the fact
they fled from a country considered by the United States to be a pariah.
Thus, usual legal practices trumped the foreign policy and political motivations for treatment of Cuban migrants. Initially, the annual flow of Cubans to
the U.S. was "a small enough number to allow for a relatively normal immigration procedure."'' 6 The U.S. handled the Camarioca Boatlift and the "Cuban airlift, the largest airborne refugee operation in American history,"'3 7
without making any adjustments to the legal regime governing admission to
the United States. Cubans were simply paroled. into the U.S. There were
also no adjustments to the view that persons who fled Cuba were voting
against Communism although a Central Intelligence Agency assessment
concluded that most were "disaffected because of the economic situation and
133. See id. at 947. Orlando Bosch was responsible for Cuba unilaterally disavowing in

1976 an anti-hijacking agreement with the United States of three years earlier. After he blew
up a Cuban plane, which Cuba deemed a "CIA plot," the agreement was terminated. See
MASUD-PILOTO 11, supra note 15, at 96.
134. Avila, 724 F. Supp. at 947.
135. Id. Relying upon the 1953 Supreme Court decision in the leading case of Mezei, the
court said the procedural process for one seeking admission is only that which Congress determines. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (U.S.N.Y. 1953).
136. MASUD-PILoTo II, supra note 15, at 58. The phrase "normal immigration procedure" is somewhat misleading in that Cubans did not come by having to qualify for available
visas or to individually establish refugee status. Indeed, Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir.
1979) argued that charging against the Western Hemisphere quota the visa numbers assigned
to approximately 145,000 Cubans operated to the detriment of plaintiffs, unprocessed visa
applicants from other Western Hemisphere countries.
137. MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 68.
138. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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not political oppression."' 39 Before the Freedom Flotilla in 1980, President
Carter had announced the U.S. would "continue to provide an open heart and
open arms to refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination and
from economic deprivation brought about primarily by Fidel Castro and his
government."'" The "open heart and open arms" speech prompted 125,000
Cubans to leave from the Port of Mariel to come to the United States in what
is known as the Freedom Flotilla. A boatlift had already commenced after an
incident at the Peruvian embassy in April 1980, a month before the speech.
Initially only six Cubans were involved, but after "Cuban radio announced
that anyone who wanted to leave the country should go to the Peruvian embassy,"'' it was inundated by 10,000 people. Castro's view was that they
were not persecuted refugees but merely people who wanted a better economic life.4 2 However, he opened the Port of Mariel to "anyone whose relatives in the states came to Mariel to claim them. 14 3 Thus, "Carter's 'open
hearts and open arms' remarks were interpreted as a signal of proceed with
the boatlift."' But unlike prior administrations, the legal landscape had
changed.
Under the Refugee Act of March 1980, passed only five weeks before Mariel, the United States had placed a yearly quota of 19,500 refugees from
Cuba. In addition, individual case reviews were required before refugee
status was granted.... Technically and legally, the45 Cubans were simply
undocumented aliens seeking asylum, not refugees.
The U.S. tried to dissuade the Freedom Flotilla, but ultimately 125,000
Cubans came. Some Marielitos became "confused and frustrated' ' 146 as they
were detained, although most ultimately were released. Issues of inadmissibility and detention are associated with the Marielitos but "the treatment of
members of the Freedom Flotilla was only unusual because for the first time
Cuban refugees were encountering some of the same problems that refugees
from other countries had encountered."'4 7 However, some Mariel Cubans did
139. MASUD-PLOTO II, supra note 15, at 60.
140. Remarks of President Jimmy Carter made in response to a question from a representative of the League of Women Voters at a May 5, 1980 press conference, referred to as the
"open heart and open arms statement." See Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 897
n.16 (N.D. Ga. 1985). To link the word "refugee" with economic deprivation as the "open
hearts, open arms" speech did, expands the legal understanding of "refugee." See supra notes
109-10.
141. MASUD-PILOTO H, supra note 15, at 79.
142. See id. at 80.

143. Id. at 83.

144. Id.
145. MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 84.
146. Id. at 86.
147. Richard A. Boswell, ThrowingAway the Key: Limits on the Plenar. Power? Reviet,
of Felix Masud-Piloto,from Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the
U.S., 1959-1995 and Mark S. Hamm, The Abandoned Ones: The Imprisonment and Uprising
of the Mariel Boat People, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 689, 703 (1997).
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differ from predecessor Cuban migrants. Of importance is "a matter that has
been largely ignored by most writers on the subject of the freedom flotilla,"
"[T]hose who arrived in the Flotilla and were subsequently incarcerated
were (sic) overwhelmingly Afro-Cuban origin..."'

While the indefinite

incarceration of some Mariel Cubans is beyond the scope of this article,'49 it
should be emphasized that because those incarcerated are mostly AfroCuban, their detention implicates the U.S. color-based approach to decisionmaking rather than proving that Cubans are not "special favorites."
In fact, the "special favorites" notion is confirmed by the result of a legal challenge associated with the entry of Marielitos. An en banc Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of eighty-four indictments
against persons who brought 125,000 Cubans to Florida.' One author asserts "the Mariel boatlift clearly showed that the United States had no control over immigration from Cuba."'' Indeed, when the U.S. tried to stop the
departure from Cuba, Castro "defiantly told Carter that Mariel Harbor would
remain open."'52 As Masud-Piloto concludes:
From April 20 to September 26, 1980, Cuban immigration to the United
States was directed from Havana, not Washington. The Cuban government
unilaterally decided when to open and when to close Mariel Harbor for
emigration, directed marine traffic to and from Mariel, and decided on
each of the 125,000 Cubans5who
came to the United States during the five
3
months the operation lasted.

While Cuba did play a central role in the events of 1980, it was the U.S.
political policies that set the stage. Castro's "good riddance" to "anybody

148. Boswell, supra note 147, at 707. It could be argued that color based discrimination
thus trumps favored nationality status.

149. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gail Marlowe, The Availability of ConstitutionalSafeguards to
Detain Cuban Aliens, 17 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 153 (1987); Richard A. Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion-The Rights of Cuban Refugees Facing Indefinite Detention in the United
States, 17 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925 (1984); Philip Erickson, The Saga of Indefinitely DetainedMariel Cubans: Garcia-MirD. 'Meese, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 271
(1998). See also Gisbert v. U.S., 988 F.2d 1437, 1439 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993):
In December, 1984, Cuba and the United States reached an agreement pursuant to
which Cuba was to take back 2,746 Mariel Cubans. Cuba suspended the agreement
in May 1985, after only 201 excludable Cubans had been returned. In November

1987, Cuba agreed to resume implementation of the 1984 agreement.

Id. Another agreement in 1993 related to Marielitos who had committed crimes in the U.S. In
September 1993 there were "4500 Cuban prisoners in 37 federal prisons." U.S. Returning
1500 Cuban Prisonersto Castro, CFm. TRm., Sept. 29, 1993, at 12.

150. See Pollgreen v. Morris, 770 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1985). See also U.S. v. Armendaris, 600 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla.
1980), aff'd, 685 F.2d 1271 (11th Cir. 1982).

151. MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 87.
152. Id. at 85.

153. Id.
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who wishes to go to any other country where he is received,"'" obviously
was dependent on the attitude of the receiving country. Therefore, the 1980
Freedom Flotilla from Cuba did not depend on either Cuba or the United
States alone. Indeed, the 1980 "Mariel exodus proved that both sides could
play refugee politics."'55 That political game was played again almost fifteen
years later. The practical result for those fleeing Cubans was the same: parole into the United States. But as the next section demonstrates, there was a
major U.S. policy change.
IV. THE BALSEROS AND A POLICY CHANGE

They set out in foam boxes, inner tubes and packing crates that pass for
rafts, loading their flimsy vessels with bare essentials-a plastic container
virgin or a Sanwith water, fried meat and bread, an image of the Catholic
56
teria deity tucked away, a compass pointing north." On August 19, 1994,

President Bill Clinton closed the doors that had been opened to Cubans for
more than thirty-five years. From that day on, Cubans were intercepted at
sea and transported 57to detention camps at the U.S. Naval Station at GuantAnamo Bay, Cuba.'
In December 1980, Fidel Castro said "'Mariel has not been resolved, it
has simply been suspended. '"' ' 5 8 In August 1994 another exodus from Cuba
occurred which some called Mariel II."5 This time the migrants came in
rafts, leading to their appelation balseros (rafters). Many were people born
after Castro took power in 1959 and it was whispered that many were darkskinned."6 Their reception by the U.S. was significantly different from those
who came in the 1980 Freedom Flotilla. Instead of promising an "open heart
and open arms," President Clinton initially did not allow the balseros to en-

154. MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 85 (quoting MIAMI HERALD, May 2, 1980, at

30a).
155. MASUD-PLOTO II, supra note 15, at 95.
156. Mireya Navarro, Scores of Cubans, in Flight, Perishin FloridaStraits,N.Y. TMES,
Aug. 24, 1994, at Al.
157. MASUD-PILOrO II, supra note 15, at xix.
158. Pdrez, supra note 99, at 130.
159. See Cuban Exodus is Unlike 1980 Flight, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1994, at A8. "'In
Mariel they were coming over in freighters, tankers and large vessels' ... many of which
were hired by Cuban-Americans who cruised to the port of Mariel to take family members to
Florida." Id.
160. See Jon Nordheimer, Cuban-Americans Ambivalent on Shift-Many Criticize U.S.
Move butAlso FearAnother Mariel,N. Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1994, at 8:
Another element that has not gone unnoticed and is grist for private conservations
(sic) is that many of the new refugees are dark-skinned. How they will be received
in Miami among light-skinned refugees of a generation ago is a subject open to
debate.
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ter the United States. 6 ' Rather, they were intercepted en route to the United
States 62 and detained at the U.S. naval base at Guantinamo Bay, ironically a
facility located in their homeland of Cuba. So about 35,000 balseros left
Cuba only to be returned to that country, albeit a portion leased by the
United States. 63 Although separated from the Cubans, Haitian migrants were
also detained on Guantdinamo Bay. It could be argued that the reversal of
long-standing U.S. policy to welcome fleeing Cubans did respond "to criticism that [the U.S.] had been treating Cuban refugees differently from Haitian refugees, a policy criticized by many black lawmakers as racist."'6" Neither Cuban nor Haitians were able to establish a legal right of entry to the
United States following interdiction. However, Guantdnamo Bay Cubans,
unlike Haitians,"6 ultimately gained access to the U.S. even though the Cu161. President Clinton referred to the balseros as illegal refugees, an inexact term. Presumably he meant to suggest they had no visas and also did not qualify for refugee status under applicable law.
Today I have ordered that illegal refugees from Cuba will not be allowed to enter
the United States. Refugees rescued at sea will be taken to our naval base at
Guantbnamo while we explore the possibility of other safe havens within the region.
To enforce this policy, I have directed the Coast Guard to continue its expanded
effort to stop any boat illegally attempting to bring Cubans to the United States.
The United States will detain, investigate and, if necessary, prosecute Americans
who take to the sea to pick up Cubans. Vessels used in such activities will be
seized.
Excerpts From News Conference Announcing Policy on Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20,
1994, at 10.
162. Balseros expected to be rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard as the rafts were not designed to withstand the 90-mile journey to the U.S. Some critics contended "that the Coast
Guard and Navy rescue effort, by operating right up to the 12-mile limit on Cuban territorial
waters" actually served as a magnet for potential migrants. George de Lama, Wily Castro
backs Clinton into corner, Cmn. TRiB. Aug. 25, 1994, at 1, 27. While rescue may have been
expected, the policy of detaining Cubans on Guantdnamo undoubtedly was not anticipated.
163. See MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at xix. At the time of the 11th circuit decision
discussed in text accompanying notes 166-79, infra, 20,000 were in "safe havens" on
Guantdnamo or Panama. See Cuban American Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1419
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995).
164. William Neikirk & Terry Atlas, Pulling Up the Welcome Mat, Cmi. TRm. Aug. 20,
1994, at 1. Interdiction of Haitians on the high seas first occurred on October 12, 1981 when a
Coast Guard cutter stopped the Exoribe with 56 Haitians on board. See Haitian and Cuban
Interdiction:Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Immigration,Refugees and InternationalLaw
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1989) (report of National
Coalition for Haitian Refugees). A Floridian commented that "'There's absolutely no difference between these new Cuban refugees and the Haitians trying to get here by boat...
They're all coming here for jobs. The only real difference is 99 percent of the Haitians are
black so no one cuts them a break."' Jon Nordheimer, Where the Sounds of Spanish Grate,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1994, at C7; see also Kevin R. Johnson, JudicialAcquiescence to the
Executive Branch's Pursuitof ForeignPolicy and DomesticAgendas in Immigration Matters:
The Caseof the HaitianAsylum-Seekers, 7 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4 n.12 (1993).
165. A challenge to the first Haitian interdiction program was not successful. See Haitian
Refugee Center v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C.
Cir. 1987). See also Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Joyce A. Hughes
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ban's "day in court" was not successful.
Cuban American Bar Association, Inc. v. Christopher["CABA"]' 6 involved 20,000 balseros held at the U.S. naval base at Guantnamo Bay,
Cuba. Before the case, the Attorney General had already used her power of
parole to bring to the U.S. various Cuban migrants: those over seventy years
of age; those who were ill; unaccompanied minors under age thirteen. The
approximately 20,000 at Guantdnamo primarily were young men. The case
commenced with high drama:
On October 25, 1994 upon learning that at 11:30 a.m. that day the government would return to Cuba, by plane, twenty-three Cuban migrants
who had previously volunteered for repatriation, the Cuban Legal Organizations and the individual Cuban plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for
a temporary restraining order and request for an emergency hearing to
block the repatriation. Approximately one minute before the plane was to
take off, the district court verbally ordered the government to halt the repatriation ....
,
In CABA, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,'" in which the Supreme Court ruled that
the INA and its provision against repatriation'69 did not apply extraterritorially.'70 So the crucial question was whether the U.S. Naval facility at
Guantlinamo Bay was United States territory. The court rejected "the argument that our leased military bases abroad which continue under the sovereignty of foreign nations, hostile or friendly, are 'functional[ly] equivalent'
to being land borders or ports of entry of the United States or otherwise
within the United States."' 7 ' Since the Guantdnamo Bay Cubans were seeking asylum in the United States the legal requirements for that status are important. As indicated previously, one must be a refugee. 72 Additionally, in
& Linda Crane, Haitians: Seeking Refuge in the United States, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747
(1993). In addition, Guantdnamo Cuban minors were ultimately allowed in the United States
while Haitian minors were not. See CABA v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1427 (11th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995).

166. 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995).
167. Id. at 1420.
168. 509 U.S. 155 (U.S.N.Y. 1993).
169. Previously called withholding of removal, the nomenclature is now restriction on
removal. See INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (1999). It was designed to codify the
prohibition against refoulement (return) of refugees which is in Article 33 of the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 19 U.S.T. 6259)
and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 19 U.S.T. 6223) to
which the U.S. acceded in 1968.
170. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 163-64, 169.
171. CABA, 43 F.3d at 1425. See also supra text accompanying note 14. The rental fee
for land leased from Cuba for the GuantAnamo Bay U.S. naval base is $1,000 a year. "As a
symbol of protest, Castro's ...regime hasn't cashed any of the checks since taking power in
1959." George de Lama, U.S. beefs up navalpresence to snare Cubans, Cm. TRam., Aug. 23,

1994, at 6.
172. See INA § 101(A)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42) (1999).
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order to apply for asylum an alien must be "physically present in the United
States."'73 Therefore, if Guantinamo Bay is not considered part of the United
States, the Cubans located there had no legal right to applyfor asylum.
Prior to the 11 th Circuit's decision in CABA, the United States and Cuba
had reached a migration accord (Communiqu6)."74 Pursuant to this, "the Attorney General ordered that no Cuban who had accepted safe haven in
Guantdnamo Bay or Panama would be allowed to apply for a visa or for asylum in the United States."'75 The Communiqu6 also provided that a minimum
of 20,000 Cubans per year would be admitted or paroled into the U.S.'76 The
agreement is unprecedented since the United States has not guaranteed a
minimum number of entrants from any other country.'77 Indeed, the INA is
structured to prevent admission of too large a number from one country. So
legislation expresses the yearly maximum from any one country. 7 ' As CABA
found the balseros had no legal right to admission in the United States, the
previously agreed upon Communiqud, a political migration accord, governed
their fate and those who subsequently sought to leave Cuba. The Communiqu6 was clear in denying Cubans on Guantinamo Bay any right to enter
the United States from that location. It was equally clear in offering Cubans
a carrot by providing for means of entry to the United States if they returned
to Cuba. While the ostensible effect of not accepting applications for a visa
or asylum from Guant.namo was to force balseros back to Cuba, even before the CABA decision, "the U.S... ." offered the Cuban migrants safe haven [on Guantdnamo] for as long as they wished.'79
Five months after the court ruled in CABA, the Clinton Administration
announced that "Cubans in safe haven 'will be admitted into the United
States on a case-by-case basis as special Guantinamo entrants."" 8 The decision, reached after secret discussions with Cuban representatives, 8 ' in effect
173. INA § 208(a) (1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(1) (1999).
174. See Joint Communiqui between U.S. & the Republic of Cuba, Sept. 9, 1994, 71
INTEmP. REL. 1236 (Sept. 12, 1994), 1994 WL 621517 (treaty) [hereinafter Communiqui.]
175. CABA, 43 F.3d at 1418. The ostensible effect of this provision was to force balseros back to Cuba to apply to come to the U.S. but actually they were ultimately paroled from
Guantdnamo. See infra text accompanying note 178.
176. See Communiqug, supra note 174.
177. See U.S.-Cuba Reach Important MigrationAgreement, 71 INTERP. REL. 1213 (Sept.
12, 1994).
178. See INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1999). In the year before the Communiqu6,
fewer than 3000 Cubans received immigrant visas. See U.S., Cuba Reach Refugee Accord,
Cfu. TRm.Sept. 10, 1994, at 8. The cause: Perhaps to make "'things tougher than necessary,
perhaps to make them tougher for the Cuban Government."' Tim Golden, ForCubans Seeking Visas, 'Lamentations,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994 at A6. The 3000 visas given to Cubans
in 1993 was far less than the per country annual maximum of 27,884. See Sean Holten, Law
Limits Cuban Immigration, Officials Say, Cm. Tu., Sept. 1, 1994, at 26. Hence, the Communiqu6 contemplated a substantial increase in Cuban immigrants to the U.S.
179. See CABA, 43 F.3d at 1418.
180. Clinton AdministrationReverses Policy on Cubans, 72 INTERP. REL. 622, 623 (May
8, 1995) [hereinafter Reversal].
181. See id. at 623.
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renounced the policy behind the Communiqu6 which prohibited entry to the
U.S. for Guantdnamo Cubans. Cost savings were cited since $1 million per
day was expended to keep Cubans at Guantdnamo and $100 million in upgrades had been planned.' More significantly, "the Administration made the
decision to allow the Cubans into the U.S. after members of Congress and
others warned that a crisis was in the making ... as the Guantdnamo Cubans
could riot, and thousands more Cubans could take to the sea."'" The decision
to allow Guantdnamo Cubans into the United States was not extended to

Haitians. It caused Cubans joy,"8 but there was criticism of the simultaneous

announcement that Cubans on the high seas trying to reach the United States
would be interdicted and returned to Cuba.'85
Actually, the 1994 Communiqu6 had already provided that "migrants
rescued at sea attempting to enter the United States will be taken to safe haven facilities outside the United States." In addition, it specifically noted discontinuance of the "practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who

reach U.S. territory in irregular ways." '86 But the 1995 policy position-

emanating from a May U.S.-Cuba Joint Statement ("Joint Statement")' made a significant change in that Cubans were to be returned to Cuba and
could no longer expect to be taken to Guantdnamo Bay and hope for ultimate
entry into the U.S. While balseros enjoyed that fate under the Joint Statement, theoretically it would not happen to subsequent migrants. That 1995
migration accord provided the U.S. could count Guantdnamo balseros towards meeting the minimum number of Cubans it was to admit each year
pursuant to the September 9, 1994 agreement."'8 Thus the entry of
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See Viva Guantdnamo Libre, TIME, May 15, 1995, at 50. "[The decision to admit
most of the Guantdnamo Cubans is ... in contrast to the treatment being accorded most Haitians. There was no reversal of the decision not to allow most of the 251 unaccompanied Haitian children and 225 Haitian adults now at Guantdnamo into the United States." Reversal,
supra note 180; see also Bill Frelick, Needed: A ComprehensiveSolution for Cuban Refugees,

72

INTERPR. REL.

121, 122 (Jan. 23, 1995).

185. See Mireya Navarro, New Policy on Cubans Met By Protest Drive, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1995 at A1O; The Clinton Administration's reversal of U.S. immigrationpolicy toward Cuba, Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the Com. on Int'l
Relations, 104th Cong. 1st Sess., May 18, 1995; Cuban exiles protest new U.S. Policy, Cmn.
TRiB. May 9, 1995, at 1; Steven Greenhouse, US Will Return Refugees To Cuba In Policy
Switch, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1995, at Al; James Yuenger, Experts Question Timing of Decision on Cubans, CHI. TRIB., at 12. The late chairman of the Cuban American National Foundation, Jorge Mas Canoso was so antagonistic to the announced interdiction and repatriation
policy that "fifteen thousand sponsors that were waiting to help with resettlement expenses
for the Guantanamo Cubans [were withdrawn). 'They made this policy alone,' said Mr. Mds
Canoso. 'Let them now solve the problems of Guantanamo alone."' Reversal, supra note 180,
at 624.
186. Coinmuniqu6, supra note 174.
187. See Joint Statement on NormalizingMigration between Cuba and the United States,
May 2, 1995, 35 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALs 328 (1996) [hereinafter Joint Statement].
188. Id.
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Guantdnamo Bay Cubans was not by legal right, but by political decision, a
result forecast by CABA:
While we have determined that these migrants are without legal rights that
are cognizable in the courts of the United States, we observe that they are
nonetheless beneficiaries of the American tradition of humanitarian concern and conduct.... Nevertheless, we cannot contravene the law of this
Circuit and of the Supreme Court of the United States in order to frame a
adlegal answer to what is traditionally and properly a problem to be
dressed by the legislative and executive branches of our government.8 9
While those Cubans on Guantdnamo in May 1995 were the "beneficiaries of the American tradition of humanitarian concern and conduct,"'90 those
subsequently interdicted and returned to Cuba would benefit from no such
tradition. 9 ' Yet unlike other migrants, the U.S. continues to express concern
for returned Cubans. Congress requires biannual reports of "the treatment by
the government of Cuba of persons who have returned to Cuba pursuant to
the United States-Cuba agreement of May 1995."'" Also, as an "extraordinary measure," the 1994 Communiqu6 authorized entry to the U.S. of Cubans on the waiting list for visas in September 1994.' The Communique
also stated how, "in conformity with United States law" the number could be
expanded beyond 20,000: immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not subject to numerical limits. 9 The 20,000 is to include those selected by lottery,
a feature important to persons like the balseros,many of whom were "young
men in their 20's and 30's ... and often without family in the United
States."'95 Like other migrants, Cubans who actually reach the United
States-by whatever means-are "physically present" and thus meet the
statutory requirement to apply for asylum.'96 Nonetheless, the "presumptive
189. CABA, 43 F.3d at 1429.
190. Id.
191. From May 2, 1995 through September 30, 1998 the U.S. interdicted approximately
2,000 Cubans, a majority of whom were returned directly to Cuba. U.S. Dept. of State, Office
of Cuban Affairs, Report to Congress U.S.-Cuba Migration Accord, June 8, 1999 (on file
with author).
192. Omnibus Consolidated Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 105277, § 2245 (Oct. 21, 1998).
193. That waiting list totaled 19,700. See Tim Golden, For Cubans Seeking Visas,
'Lamentations,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at A6.
194. Immediate relatives are parents, spouses and children of U.S. citizens. See INA §
201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(I) (1999).
195. Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Planning to Hold a Lottery to Pick Some Cuban Immigrants, N.Y. TuviEs, Sept. 29, 1994, at A4. See also INS Announces Second Cuban Migration
Program, 73 INMTRP. REL. 319 (Mar. 18, 1996).
196. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(a)(1) (1999). The physical presence requirement
has lured Chinese to "take a boat to Guam, a U.S. territory 1,700 miles from the Chinese
mainland." Craig S. Smith, Wanna Leave China? Make It To Guam, and the U.S. Beckons,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999. Given that water within 12 miles of a country's shore is considered its territory under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1272
(Jan. 1982), the attempt to prevent Cubans in those waters from setting foot on U.S. soil be-
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refugee status for all Cubans"'97 theoretically has ended. This is illustrated by
the cases discussed in the next section.
V. A NEW DAY
We must not let any nation, even a nation as close to us as Cuba, even
with so many American citizens of Cuban descent, control the immigration policy of the United States and violate the borders of the United
States." 8

When Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, he was not expected to remain at the helm. However, he began his fourth term as Cuban president in
March 1993.' The U.S. no longer believes "that the implosion of the existing order in Havana is imminent."' The U.S. has also recognized that Castro has played "David to our Goliath." '' From the airlift in the 1960s and 70s
to the boatlift in the 80s, the U.S. arrived at a 1994 policy, which seeks to
"deter irregular migration... and to prevent the chaotic, uncontrolled arrival
of undocumented migrants from Cuba."20 2
This new day is seen clearly by contrasting approaches to Cuban hijackers. Until 1994, "the United States had routinely granted refugee status to
Cubans who had seized military jets, commercial aircraft, helicopters, cropdusting planes and a variety of sea-going vessels." 3 A celebrated occurrence
was that involving Orestes Lorenzo, a major in the Cuban airforce, who hijacked his MIG plane to the U.S. in the early 1990s. Lorenzo appeared on
U.S. television and was once a parade grand marshall at Disney World."l Indeed, just before the Joint Statement in May 1995, a "man accused by President Fidel Castro of hijacking a Cuban Government boat and killing a naval
cause of an assumed distinction between land and water is arguably not tenable. See supra
text accompanying note 21. Yet the Immigration and Nationality Act can be read to support
U.S. right to interdict aliens even though they are in U.S. waters since the statutory language
treats U.S. waters equivalnt to international waters. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158

(a)(1) (1998).
197. Bill Frelick, Needed: A Comprehensive Solution for Cuban Refugees, 72 INTERP.
REL. 121, 128 (Jan. 23, 1995).
198. White House Office of Communication, Pres. Statement on Crime Bill Procedural
Vote, Aug. 25, 1994, available in 1994 WL 459663.
199. See Castro Elected to 4th Term as Cuban President, Cm. SuN-TIMES, Mar. 26,

1993, at 26.
200. Speech by Michael Ranneberger, Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Dept. of State, to
Governor's Free Cuba Task Force, Newark, N.J., Apr. 30, 1997 <http:llwww.state.gov/
www/regions/wha/970430_.ranneberger.html>.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Larry Rohter, Cuba Gives Long Prison Terms to Six Who Tried to Flee to U.S.,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1997, at A10.
204. See Peter Michelmore, Rendezvous in Cuba, READER's DIG., May 1993, at 67-73;
Love and Guts: Cuban Returnsfor Family, Cfr. TRiB., Dec. 21, 1992, at 3.
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officer... [was] granted political asylum in the United States."205 But among
the first sent back to Cuba after the 1995 accord were persons who commandeered a tugboat."l Then, toward the end of 1997, a U.S. Immigration Judge
in Virginia denied asylum to Cuban Military officer Jose Fernandez Pupo
even though a Washington D.C. jury had acquitted him of hijacking (Fer-

nandez).2 On the other hand, a Florida Immigration Judge granted asylum
to Cubans Jose Roberto Bello-Puente, Adel Regalado Ulloa (Regalado) and
Leonardo Reyes Ramirez (Bello-Puente),after they were acquitted of hijacking in Tampa, Florida.0 At the current time, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is appealing the latter decision to the BIA, asserting applicants are ineligible for asylum.'
Among the exclusions from eligibility for asylum, is being inadmissible
to the U.S. because one "has engaged in terrorist activity."2 ' Such an activity
includes "the highjacking... of any conveyance..

."2"

That activity has

been an issue of concern between Cuba and the United States for some time.
In 1973 there was an anti-hijacking agreement, "but the Cubans unilaterally
renounced [it] in 1976 in retaliation for the blowing up of a Cuban airliner
off the coast of Barbados by Cuban exile terrorist Orlando Bosch." ' Then in
the 1980s there were several instances in which Marielitos hijacked U.S.
commercial planes to return to Cuba." 3 While Cuba promptly returned the

plane and passengers to the U.S., the hijackers were not sent back for trial in
the U.S. Cuba claimed "the U.S. government was responsible for the hijackings.21 4 In the 1994 Communiqu6, Cuba and the U.S. agreed "to oppose and

prevent the use of violence by any persons seeking to reach or who arrive in,
205. CubanHijackerReleased, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A20.
206. Cuba's displeasure was expressed with sentences from 8 to 20 years. See Larry Rohter, Cuba Gives Long Prison Terms to Six Who Tried to Flee to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1997, at Al0.
207. See In re Jose Leonardo Fernandez Pupo, #A 74-060-494, Dept. of Justice, Exec.
Off. for Immig. Rev., 11/14/97 (on file with author) [hereinafter Fernandez].
208. See In re Jose Roberto Bello-Puente, #A 72-560-015; In re Adel Regaldo Ulloa, #A
72-560-016; In re Leonardo Reyes Ramirez, #A 74-933-218, Dept. of Justice, Exec. Ofc. for
Imnmig. Rev. 12/15/98 (on file with author) [hereinafter Bello-Puente]
209. Telephone interview with Attorney Ralph E. Fernandez, Counsel to asylum claimants (June 28, 1999).
210. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v) (1999). Another exclusionfirmly resettled"-was applied to a Cuban who had lived 6 years in Spain before seeking asylum. In re U.S. Matter of D-L- & A-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 409, available in 1991 WL 353529
(BIA 1991).
211. INA § 212(a) (3)(B)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (1999).
212. MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 96. For a discussion of the case excluding
Bosch from the U.S., see supra text accompanying note 133.
213. See MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 96.
214. Id. That claim is supported by persons who defended a charge of air piracy by
claiming "the hijacking was authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") .... "
U.S. v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1990). See also U.S. v. Mena, 933 F.2d 19
(1st Cir. 1991) (defendant unsuccessfully sought conviction reversal since hijacking did not
succeed).
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the United States from Cuba by forcible diversions of aircraft and vessels. 21 5
Although Cuban asylum claimants in both Fernandez and Bello-Puente
were acquitted of criminal air hijacking charges,2 16 immigration judges (IJ)
reached opposing results on asylum. Of course, a criminal proceeding cannot
dictate a result in a civil proceeding. The former is guided by the proof standard of beyond a reasonable doubt while the preponderance of evidence
standard applies in civil immigration proceeding. 17 In addition, "committing" a terrorist act, to use the language of the immigration statute, arguably
is different from being "convicted" of such an act. However, the acquittal of
hijacking was not the important factor in both of the above decisions. In
Fernandez, the U did not find the applicant credible, and ruled "that any fear
of persecution was not 'on account of Applicant's political opinions. 21 8
Given that Fernandez did not meet the threshold requirement of being a
refugee, finding him ineligible for asylum based on hijacking was dicta.219
Nonetheless, it is clear that the U was hostile to "hijacking a plane with innocent men, women, and children aboard."' In addition, he pointed out
channels for departure from Cuba to the U.S. since the 1994 Communiqu6.
The U later noted that Cubans "flee successfully from Cuba each year by
swimming, fence jumping, or rafting."'" In noting this, he failed to take cognizance that such migrants are subject to interdiction and return to Cuba after
the 1995 Joint Statement, and that they have no automatic right to parole in
the U.S. under the 1994 migration accord.
A major difference between Fernandez and Bello-Puente is that asylum
applicant Fernandez used "euphemisms like 'diversion' and 'commandeering' of the plane."2 However, in Bello-Puente it was claimed that Pantoja,
the Cuban pilot of the plane who subsequently returned to Cuba, had "assisted with the plans and agreed to fly.., to the United States."' Thus, the
Bello-Puente asylum applicants claimed that they never hijacked the plane,"4
and the U agreed with them, finding that the Cuban pilot who testified
against them was not credible.' If the BIA upholds the conclusion of no hi215. Comnuniqud, supra note 174. (The quoted material is located in the section of
Alien Smuggling). In fact, the criminal prosecution of asylum applicants in Bello-Puente was
assisted by Cuba providing "government documents and materials relevant to their own investigation of the alleged hijacking." Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 12.
216. See 49 U.S.C. § 46502(a)(b) (1999).
217. See Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 25.
218. Fernandez, supra note 207, at 2.
219. See id. at 14.
220. Id. at 15.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 10.
223. Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 5.
224. See id. at 9. Applicants "initially represented that they hijacked the plane from Mr.
Pantoja but later recanted their admission, explaining that they created the story to protect Mr.
Pantoja upon his expected return to Cuba." Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 28.
225. See id. at 26-27.
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jacking, then the Bello-Puente applicants are not precluded by statute from
gaining asylum. The critical issue is whether they are refugees.
The fear of persecution claimed was "on account of' political opinion.
The only evidence of political activity by Bello-Puente claimants in Cuba
was releasing pro-democracy political leaflets from the plane just before
heading "north for Florida." 6 The more crucial basis for claimed refugee
status was activity by Regalado in the U.S. following the hijacking trial and
the association of Ramirez and Bello-Puente with him. "A person who was
not a refugee when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee at a later
date, is called a refugee 'sur place."' 2" However, as the INS has observed,
"activities by an alien against his or her home country while in the U.S. have
not been given as much weight as activities in the persecuting country."'
The Bello-Puente and Fernandezcases took divergent views on this issue. In
the latter, the IJ ruled that "respondent's revelation while in the United
States that he is a dissident should not form the factual predicate for a finding... that... [there is] a well-founded fear of persecution."' 9 A contrary
conclusion was found in Bello-Puente. Here, the Court found that events in
the U.S. could form that predicate. This was aided by an INS stipulation
"that if one were to cooperate with the FBI as a witness against the government of Cuba, then'such a person would be at risk of persecution upon return
to Cuba."" The stipulation was buttressed by testimony of Jose Basulto, a
founding member of BTTR, that information provided by Regalado would
show "the Cuban government did premeditate the downing of the BTTR
planes...."'
It undoubtedly helped that the asylum applications in Bello-Puente
could be related to the 1996 BTTR incident. The witness Jose Basulto was
flying a third plane and escaped injury when, as the INS stipulated, "on February 24, 1996 two Cuban Migs shot down two BTTR planes .... , 2 As indicated above, that incident prompted the passage of the Helms-Burton
Act,"3 and provoked outrage,' and then U.S. retaliatory actions." 5 However,
226. Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 5.
227. Handbook, supra note 116, 1 94.
228. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, INS, THE BASIC LAW MANUAL 71 (1994).
229. Fernandez, supra note 207, at 14.
230. Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 18. Rejecting the INS argument that since neither
Ramirez nor Bello-Puente participated in debriefings by the FBI on the BTTR incident as did
Regalado, they could not qualify as refugees, the I concluded they were "similarly situated"
and that all three would be persecuted as a "particular social group," a statutory basis for
refugee qualification. Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 35-37, 40-41.
231. Id. at 17.
232. Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 15. The U.S. resident was a Cuban national. All the
citizens were of Cuban descent, two of whom were born in the United States. See supra text
accompanying note 79.
233. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
234. Madeleine K. Albright, now U.S. Secretary of State and then US delegate to the
U.N., was "visibly angry" at a press conference when she made the strong comment that the
action of Cuban pilots was "not cojones (balls) ... [but was] cowardice." Barbara Crossette,
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some of those sanctions have been liftedY6 Asylum applicant Regalado cooperated with the FBI in investigating the incident. This cooperation may
have favorable political consequences for those who want to paint Cuba as
an evil empire. But does that indicate his political opinion? To be a refugee
requires persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution "on account of' a
statutory factor, one of which is political opinion. In Bello-Puente, the INS
stipulated that cooperation with the FBI could lead to persecution by Cuba.
But an essential question is whether it would be "on account of' political
opinion. That requires an assessment of whether the claimed refugee has a
political opinion and whether the prior or anticipated persecution is because
of that opinion. In Bello-Puente the I. did not reference any direct testimony
by Bello-Puente claimant Regalado of a political opinion. 7 Thus, a critical
issue is whether his telling the FBI that Cuba did premeditate the attack on
the BTTR planes is a political opinion. 8 Actually, the substance of what
Regalado told the FBI should make no difference. The question is whether
his cooperating with the FBI at all, is the expression of a political opinion.
In a similar situation, although it involved silence rather than speaking
out, the majority in a Second Circuit case found political opinion. Chang v.
INS239 involved the head of a delegation of visiting Chinese who did not report violations by other delegates of China's security rules. The majority
deemed this action of failing to report the violations political.' However,
the dissent was impressed that asylum seeker Chang never articulated a specific political opinion opposed to the government. It might be argued that
Regalado's actions in cooperating with the FBI were a political statement
against the Cuban regime. However, his situation is unlike Chang, where the
events allegedly creating a need to report only occurred after the delegation
was in the U.S. The BTTR incident happened six months before Regalado
left Cuba and he did not begin talking with the FBI until after he remained in
U.S. Says Cubans Knew They Firedon Civilian Planes,N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 29, 1996, at Al.
235. President Clinton cancelled all charter flights between Miami and Havana. In addition, he ordered stricter enforcement of travel restrictions on United States' citizens traveling
to Cuba. See Pres. Clinton's Remarks Announcing Sanctions Against Cuba Following the
Downing ofAmerican Civilian Aircraft, 1 PUB. PAPERS 339 (Feb. 26, 1996).
236. See Steven Erlanger, U.S. to Ease Curbs on Relief to Cuba and Money to Kin, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998 at Al. In addition, direct flights between New York and Los Angeles
and Cuba have been instituted as "part of the process... to improve people-to-people contact'...." Philip Shenon, U.S. to Allow 2 More Cities To Set Flights to Havana, N.Y. TIES,
Aug. 4, 1999, atA8.

237. The alleged opinion was evidence given by witness Basulto, a BTTR founding
member. See Bello-Puente, supra note 208, at 17.
238. It is not surprising that Cuba would "premeditate" an attack on BTIR planes which
had previously violated Cuban airspace as Basulto confirmed in his testimony. See BelloPuente, supra note 208, at 16. Six months prior to the February 1996 incident, "Castro warned
that any plane violating Cuban airspace risked being shot down." William Neikirk, U.S.
Promisesto Punish Cuba, CHI. TRiB. Feb. 26, 1996, at 1.
239. 119 F.3d 1055 (3d Cir. 1997).
240. See id.
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immigration detention even following acquittal in a hijacking trial. In addition, the only political activity in Cuba was dropping anti-Castro leaflets
from an airplane en route to the United States.
Regardless of the ultimate result on appeal in Bello-Puente, it and Fernandez are significant in illustrating the effect of no presumption of refugee
status or an automatic grant of parole. Where a migrant who seeks asylum is
not found credible, as in Fernandez, he/she will not be deemed a refugee.
With no presumption of refugee status, Cubans now run the same risk of be"
ing found incredible as other asylum applicants.24
' Moreover, without automatic right parole, there could be prolonged detention before an asylum decision. 42 Detention of undocumented aliens is mandatory under U.S. law
since the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IRAIRA"). 43 Therefore, unless paroled to meet the floor of 20,000
admittees under the 1994 Communiqu6, the absence of automatic parole for
Cubans with "irregular" arrival, means detention." No presumption of refugee status and no automatic parole suggest a new day, along with Castro's
pronouncements that mass exodus from Cuba will not be allowed. 45 But

there are still benefits to Cuban nationality. For Cubans who avoid repatria-

tion from the high seas or who arrive "irregularly," '46 the failure to presume

refugee status is of no concern if parole is granted. A Cuban migrant given
parole only need be present for a year and adjust status to that of permanent

resident alien pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act.247 In addition, there is a
statutory exemption for Cubans arriving by air from the requirement that an

undocumented migrant, seeking asylum, must make a preliminary showing
241. See Handbook, supra note 116, 41-43.
242. Regalado, Bello-Puente and Ramirez came to the U.S. on August 16, 1996 and were
detained. It was only during a removal hearing that their claims for asylum were granted on
December 15, 1998. They were freed on Christmas Eve, 1998 after protests from Florida Cuban-American representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen & Lincoln Diaz-Balart. See U.S. Frees 3
Who Fled Cuba in Plane in '96, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1998, at A21. Fernandez came to the
U.S. on July 7, 1996. His application for asylum in a removal hearing was denied November
19, 1997 but as of May, 1999 he remained detained in Virginia. Interview by Margarita Musa
with Wilfredo 0. Allen, Attorney for Fernandez, Miami, Fla. (May 18, 1999).
243. See Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009, Dov. C (Sept. 30, 1996); INA §
235(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(B)(iii)(IV) (1999).
244. See FAIR v. Reno, 93 F.3d 897, 899 (D. D.C. 1996).
245. Although Castro has denounced the U.S. "immigration policy toward Havana," he
has asserted "'categorically there is not the slightest possibility that Cuba will break its
obligations in the migration accords, and allow massive departures of illegal
immigrants'...." Andrew Cawthorne, Cuba's CastroRules Out Allowing New Sea Exodus,
<http:llnews.excite.comlnews/r/990804/04/politics-cuba-castro>.
246. "Irregular" arrival, which precludes automatic parole under the Communique, may
mean arrival at other than a port of entry.
247. For a discussion of the Cuban Adjustment Act, see supra text accompanying notes
122-129. The Communiqu6's prohibition against automatic parole was undercut by the INS
commissioner stating that "the availability of CAA [Cuban Adjustment Act] adjustment
should ordinarily weigh heavily in favor of a grant of parole." INS ClarifiesPolicy on Cuban
Adjustment, AILA MONTHLY MAILING, June 1999 at 543 (Memorandum from INS Commissioner Doris Meissner) [hereinafter Meissner].
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of "credible fear" of persecution to avoid immediate removal."4 Moreover,

inadmissibility "based on an alien's having arrived at a place other than a
port-of-entry does not apply to CAA applicants."

9

As there are still ele-

ments in U.S. law that can be cited to claim Cubans remain "special favorites," the new day where they are treated no more favorably than other na-

tionalities is still early in the morning. More importantly, politics and foreign
policy concerns remain a constant in the U.S. response to flight from Cuba.
VI. CONCLUSION

Attempting to control the political process in Cuba, the United States sacrificed some control over its own borders.... It is time for the United
States to adopt a single, nonideological, humanitarian standard for granting refugee status."
The new day in the United States response to flight from Cuba can be
attributed primarily to politics and foreign policy considerations, and perhaps to the racial composition of the current Cuban population. But the prior

policy of favoring Cuban migrants has not completely disappeared. Contradictory ideas on the U.S. approach to Cuba are evident in other areas as well.

For example, while the Helms-Burton legislation takes a tough stand against
Cuba by permitting Americans to sue those who use property nationalized
years ago, Title II allows the President to suspend that right."' Similarly, the
economic embargo of Cuba has been in U.S. public policy for decades. Yet,
there are those who believe the embargo should end, 2 and in fact are plan-

248. See INA § 235(b)(1)(F); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(F) (1999).
249. Meissner, supra note 247.
250. MASUD-PILOTO II, supra note 15, at 148-50.
251. 22 U.S.C. § 6081 (1998). President Clinton has exercised his right to suspend repeatedly. See David E.Sanger, Clinton Grants, Then Suspends, Right to Sue Foreignerson
Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1996, at Al; Helms-Burton:Two Years Later, Hearing before
Subcomn. on InternationalEconomic Policy & Trade, Com. Int'l Relations, 105" Cong., 2d
Sess. 77-79 (Mar. 12, 1998).
252. "Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-Conn) [led] ...an attempt to allow food and medical
experts to Cuba so the most vulnerable of its Cubans don't suffer... ." Deboroah Ramirez &
William E. Gibson, Cuban Exiles Lookfor New Leadership, Cm. Tgm., Nov. 25, 1997, at 3.
See also Randall Robinson, Why Black Cuba is Suffering, ESSENCE, July 1999, at 166 (Trans
Africa delegation "agreed that the embargo is inhumane.... ."); American VIPs Criticize U.S.
Limits on Food Sales to Cuba, Cm. TmB., Jan. 14, 1998, at 13 ("Castro is still standing. The
Cuban people are on their knees."); Republicans Give Clinton Some Cover on Cuba, TIME,
July 19, 1999, at 20 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed to unilateral trade sanctions); Todd
S. Purdum, Clinton Seeking Wider SanctionsAgainst Cubans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at
Al (Antonio Maceo Brigade and the Alliance of Workers of the Cuban Community opposed);
Steve Chapman, Detached From Reality on Castro, Cuba, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 29, 1996, at 23
("The embargo... is conspicuously obsolete... [a] hardship on ordinary Cubans."); Louis
Ucchitelle, Who's Punishing Whom? N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at C1 ("possibility of retaliation by foreign governments and companies ...").
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ning on it.3 Until aspects of the economic embargo were enshrined in law,'
the President had some flexibility and could weigh various opinions. Of
course, with foreign policy matters, different groups always try to advance
their interests with the executive. Thus, the president conducts foreign policy
but external groups and events influence it. Such was the case with the
Helms-Burton legislation, which President Clinton intended to veto until the
BTTR February 1996 incident favored a change. 5 But BTTR did not advocate the change in policy on Cuban migration linked to the 1994 Communiqu6.
It is noteworthy that of the three U.S. citizens who perished in the 1996
BTTR incident, two were persons of Cuban descent born in the United
States and the third came to this country very young and became a naturalized citizen. They were unlike those who came to the U.S. in prior years.
Because of the existent Cold War alignment, the U.S. could claim it was
winning that war when Cubans fled after Castro assumed power. But that
war is over. While Castro "has outlasted eight American presidents and the
odds are good that Bill Clinton will also leave office long before Castro
does, 6 and although "some Cuban exiles in the United States are still trying
to kill Castro,""n7 the political realities have changed. The exile thinking of
those allegedly plotting against a post-retirement age Castro is characteristic
of the Cuban-American National Foundation."5 The late Mds Canosa," 9 head
of the Foundation, withdrew U.S. sponsors for Cuban balserosafter the 1994

Communiqu6, which eliminated the prior policy of automatically granting
Cubans parole, and the 1995 Joint Statement, which called for repatriation.
253. A trade mission to Cuba was sought by an Illinois governor who said "'Cuba is going to open up one of these days and we want.., to be ready to go down there and do business."' CHI. SUN-TimES, Aug. 14, 1999, at 10.
254. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1966 (HelmsBurton) 22 U.S.C. § 6021.
255. See Stephen Chapman, Classic Waffling, CHI. TRm., Jan. 9, 1997, at 25.
256. See id. at 23.b.
257. Roberto Suro, 7 Charged with Plotting to Kill Castro, CHI. SUN-Tvms, Aug. 26,
1998, at 36; see Larry Rohter & Ann Louise Bardah, Cuban Exile Leader Among 7 Accused
of Plot on Castro, N.Y. TImS, Aug. 26, 1998, at A3. Initially set for trial in Puerto Rico, the
alleged perpetrators won a motion to transfer the case to Miami, although former prosecutors
have believed juries there "would be unwilling to convict such defendants, and the outcomes
of many cases filed in the 1970's and 80's supported such views." A Miami Trial For 7 Accused of Castro Plot,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at A5.
258. "At some point, all of the alleged plotters have been affiliated with the foundation
and although the indictment did not mention the foundation... [it] took the indictment as an
attack on itself." A Miami Trial For 7 Accused of Castro Plot, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1999, at
A5.
259. See Deborah Ramirez & William E. Gibson, Cuban Exiles LookforNew leadership,
CHI. TRm., Nov. 25, 1997, at 3. Mas Canosa's death was the reason given for a Cuban exile
terrorist to disclose Mas Canosa financially supported him. See Ann Louis Bardah & Larry
Rohter, His Decades of Life in the Shadows, Trying to Bring Down Castro, N.Y. TIAIES, July
13, 1998, at Al. However, he subsequently said he "deliberately misinformed" the interviewers. Cuban Exile Says he Lied to Times About FinancialSupport, N.Y. Tams, Aug. 4, 1998,
at A7.
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While his group disapproved of the changes, like other foreign policy initiatives, they resulted from changed political realities. Moreover, the color of
the population remaining in Cuba has changed from what it was before the
post-Castro exodus. It could be that alteration of U.S. official policy to no
longer automatically recognize migrants from Cuba as refugees by granting
parole was prompted by that fact.

Cuba is a country of 11 million people, and "a stroll on a Havana
street... [will] confirm government estimates of upwards to 60 percent

black or mixed population. ' - ° Cuba has been referred to as a black majority
country,26 and a "largely Black country ....

26

1'

That demographic fact may

have influenced the U.S. policy change, along with a different political reality engendered by the demise of the Cold War. Even before it denied a legal
right of entry to Cubans detained at Guantdnamo Bay, the Supreme Court
upheld U.S. interdiction and repatriation of those seeking asylum from Haiti,
a Black country adjacent to Cuba. 3 In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that "to gather fleeing refugees and return
them to the one country they had desperately sought to escape ...may...
violate the spirit" 264 of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-

gees, but it does not violate U.S. law."5 Although some argue repatriation
violates more than the "spirit" of the law,' the Supreme Court has spoken.
Thus, the policy of repatriating Cubans is not subject to attack in U.S. courts.
Although repatriation has been carried out only against people of colorAsians (Chinese),267 Blacks (Haitians) and Latinos (Cubans), the Supreme

260. Alfredo Lanier, Family Ties and Tangled Race Relations, CI. TRiB., Jan. 20, 1998,
at 13. "Both the Cuban government and analysts at the U.S. State Department and CIA agree
on a number [of Afro-Cubans] around 63%." <http:\kAfroCubaWeb.com\raceident.htm. It is
estimated that Cubans in Miami are over 97% Spanish origin. "At the very least, 85% of them
describe themselves as being White in a recent survey." Id.
261. See Afro-Latin Americans, <http:llwww.the_chronicle.demon.co.uk.tomste/
7_8_12af. htm>.
262. Randall Robinson, Why Black Cuba is Suffering, ESSENCE, July 1999, at 166.
263. Ultimately all Cubans detained at the U.S. naval base on Guantinamo were allowed
in the United States, but by political decision and not by legal right.See supra text accompanying notes 180-85.
264. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 182 (U.S.N.Y. 1993).
265. The nonrefoulement (nonreturn) provisions of U.S. law previously were called
withholding of deportation. Currently the concept is termed restriction on removal. See INA
§241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. §1231 (b)(3) (1999).
266. All of the alleged plotters have been affiliated with the foundation and although the
indictment did not mention it, "the Cuban-American National Foundation took the indictment
as an attack on itself." A Miami Trial For 7 Accused of Castro Plot, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13,
1999, at A5. See also Tim Golden, Six Men Accused of Plot Against Castro Go on Trial,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at A14.
267. In July 1993 the U.S. Coast Guard surrounded boats carrying Chinese in Mexican
waters for 13 days. It is presumed the U.S. was there at the "request" of Mexico as INS officials helped process the Chinese for repatriation. See Tod Robberson, Credibility Gap for
Mexico?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 25, 1993. There was a "news blackout" on this incident so
detailed information was not available. Telephone interview with Office of Public Affairs,
U.S. Dept. of State (July 26, 1993).
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Court's pronouncement in the Haitian case means statutory provisions on
nonrefoulement do not apply extraterritorially. In addition, statutory provisions which prohibit discrimination in visa issuance2 ' are not germane to
migrants without visas who seek refugee status and asylum. Moreover,
claims of discrimination in parole into the U.S. are not cognizable. 69
The Federation for American Immigration Reform, Inc. (FAIR), a conservative immigration organization, challenged the Communiqu6 between
Cuba and the U.S." Ostensibly that agreement ended automatic parole for
Cubans who reach the U.S. irregularly. The Communiqu6 specified an annual minimum of 20,000 visas to the U.S. for Cubans, including persons selected by lottery. A federal district court rejected the contention that FAIR's
objections to the agreement presented nonjusticiable political questions and
observed that even though foreign policy impacts immigration, the question
before a court is one of statutory interpretation.271 Nonetheless, FAIR was
held to lack standing72 so statutory provisions impacting the Communiqu6
were not discussed.
In actuality, most provisions in both the Communiqu6 and the Joint
Statement broke no new ground. Those provisions include 1) support for
prohibitions against alien smuggling; 2) repatriation; 3) discontinuance of
automatic parole; 4) admittance or parole of an annual minimum of 20,000,
including those selected by lottery. In general, these items are all governed
by existing legal norms. U.S. criminal sanctions against alien smuggling
were involved decades ago in the situation of one who smuggled persons
from Cuba to the U.S. 3 Two years before the Joint Statement, the Supreme
Court upheld high seas interdiction and repatriation of migrants trying to
268. See, e.g., INA § 202(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) (1999) prohibiting discrimination
in visa issuance "because of a person's race... nationality... or place of residence." Cf., Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State Bureau of Consular
Affairs, 404 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C.
1997).
269. See, e.g., INA § 202(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1) (1999) prohibiting discrimination
in visa issuance "because of a person's race... nationality... or place of residence." Cf., Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State Bureau of Consular
Affairs, 404 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see CABA v. Christopher, 43 F. 3d 1412 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995), rejecting claims of unaccompanied minor Haitians that
they should be paroled into the U.S. from Guantnamo the same as unaccompanied minor
Cubans.
270. Federation for American Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 897 F. Supp. 595
(D.D.C. 1995), aff'd, 93 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1996).
271. See id. at 602.
272. As did the district court, the circuit court of appeals focused on standing rather than
the migration questions. See Federation for American Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93
F. 3d 897 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1996).
273. See Campbell v. U.S., 47 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1931). Smuggling of Cubans "has soared
since U.S. efforts to tighten interdiction .... Juan 0. Tamayo, U.S. Cool to Cuban Offers to
Free Alleged Smugglers, MIAMI HERALD, July 7, 1999, at IA. Although the subtitle of the
previously cited article is "Convictions Unlikely Here", U.S. law does make it a crime to
smuggle aliens, which includes Cubans. 8 U.S.C. §1324 (1999).
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reach the U.S." 4 Immigration parole is committed to the discretion of the At-

torney General who can act for "humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest."' 75 Arguably
those standards are broad enough to permit consideration of political and
foreign policy concerns in granting parole. 6 Nonetheless immigration parole
involves a discretionary decision. An alien has no fixed right thereto. 7

However, parole of Guantdnamo Cubans was "beyond those eligible under

existing criteria", as acknowledged by the Joint Statement. 8
Along with lottery winners, annually 5,000 of those parolees are to be
counted toward reaching the 20,000 minimum number of Cuban entrants to
the U.S. This minimum number does stray from the statutory scheme. Although there are statutory provisions for a lottery 279 .and per-country limits on
immigration,' 0 no country has a statutory guarantee of a minimum number
of admissions."' But there are statutory standards for determining who is a
refugee, and thus eligible for asylum.

Persecution or a well-founded fear thereof must be because of race, religion, nationality, particular social group or political opinion. This definition shines the spotlight on the asylum applicant's political views. The BelloPuente case discussed above is troublesome because it is not clear whether

the focus remained on the political opinions of the applicants. Diverting attention to the Cuban regime risks a decision on the alleged persecuting country and not the particular applicant. For example, Cuba's actions vis a vis the
BTTR planes, no matter how reprehensible, is not a basis for asylum. Although legislation was enacted as a result of the incident, that was a political
decision. Whether a person is a refugee is not a political question, but a legal
274. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (U.S.N.Y. 1993); see supra note 271,
and accompanying text.
275. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), (3) (1999).
276. It is doubtful a court ultimately will consider the use of parole to meet the 20,000
annual minimum Cuban entrants, particularly in light of the ruling that FAIR lacks standing.
See Federation for American Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 897 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C.
1995), affid, 93 F. 3d 897 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1996).
277. In a case involving a Cuban alien, the court indicated all that is required to support
the Attorney General's action is "a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for a parole decision." Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1482 (11th Cir. 1985).
278. See Joint Statement, supra note 187. Refers to parole of Guantinamo detained Cubans being counted to meet the annual minimum of 20,000 entrants as "beyond those eligible
under existing criteria." That could be a reference to the failure to engage in a case-by-case
assessment before parole was granted, as the statute contemplates. INA §212(d)(5)(A), (B), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), (B) (1999).
279. Visas under the diversity category are awarded based upon a lottery. See INA § 203
(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1153 (e)(2) (1999).
280. The approximate per-country limit is 25,000. See INA § 202(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1152
(a)(2) (1999). In 1994, the formula worked out to 27,845 for Cuba. See Sean Holton, Law
Limits Cuba hnmigration, Officials Say, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1994, at 26.

281. "This per-country provision is sometimes misunderstood. It does not mean that each
nation is entitled to send 25,000" persons to the U.S. each year. ALEnKOFF, MARTIN &
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CInZENSHIP 295 (4th ed. 1998).
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one. In determining whether a Cuban is a refugee, the decision should be
made absent political and foreign policy considerations. It should not be assumed that merely because one lives in a socialist country that one has been
persecuted as required under the statutory provisions governing refugee
status. It has been almost twenty years since the enactment of the Refugee
Act of 1980, the purpose of which was to remove ideological slants from
refugee determinations. As the Second Circuit noted: "Examination of the
history and purpose of the relevant legislation shows that Congress intended
to insulate the asylum process from influences of politics and foreign policy."" In the past, it was just assumed that those who fled Cuba were refugees who were guided by an ideology which met the approval of the United
States, and had a fear of persecution because of that ideology. That assumption removed the incentive to examine the individual circumstances of migrants, many of whom may not have qualified as refugees under the statutory standard. The past cannot be undone. But future refugee decisions
should be made absent foreign policy and political considerations.

282. Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S.
314 (1992).
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